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Letter from the Ed itor
The humanistic mathematics movement which began as the personal vision of a few , has now
become a major pan of mathematical culture. What was viewed with skepticism is now accepted an
expected.
Our journa l attrac ts new readers and new authors. The thoughts and experiences that are shared
advance the health and strength of mathematics and the mathematical community. The mix of themes in
each issueenriches us all.
Stephanie Singer' s lively repon of a course for a general audience is an example of what can
happen when math students are in a student-friendly environment. Professor Singer describes the
excellent atmosphere "which I long to recreate in my more traditional classes." I think that she speaks for
many of us.
E.G. Bernard also discusses language and wri ting mathematics. "All young children. except the
most severely handicapped. possess a language•... (and) possess the ability to learn a system of symbolic
knowledge."
Frederick Reiner considers the many resemblances between mathematics and the arts. " if we claim
aesthetic values are inherent to our doing mathematics. can we specify what those values are or the role
they play in our practice?" "Like the philosopher of an, we are not so interes ted in developing the
concep ts of beauty as we are in applying these to a particular type of activity:'
M.K. Siu and C.1. Fung of Hong Kong write about the loss of self-esteem among math majors.
"Students lack a global view of the subject and rarely apprec iate or enjoy it from a cultural aspect, and too
little emphasis is put on the subjects' own worth."
Y. Zheng of Na nj ing Uni versity relates the ph ilosophy of math, math education , and the
philosophy of math education. Along the way, he remarks that the "new math" paid little attenti on to the
«actual cognitive processes, of how humans think about mathematics: '
The paper by a .s. Monk is reprinted from issue #2, 1988 when the newsletter was mailed to
fewer than a hundred readers. Issue #9 is being sent to over a thousand, distri buted over every continent.
The Exxon Education Foundation has supported the movement and journal since 1986, for which
we are all grateful. Their support has also made possible the timely publication of the Math Association of
America Notes Volume 32, Essays in Humanistic Mathematics. Many readers have contributed 525 or
more , which have helped stretch the budget and to buy computer software and hardware for the desk top
publi shing. The voluntary, tax deductible contributions may be sent to Harvey Mudd College, c/o Alvin
White, Humani stic Mathematics Network. The College sends each donor an acknowledgement and
thanks. I want to add my special thanks to all.
Issue # 10 should be mailed in Mayor June .
Alvin White
Letter to the Editor
The Einstein Effect Many authors have commented on the annoying fact that most people believe
that you have to be gifted , if not a gen ius, to succeed at mathematics. Consequently man y people brag
abou t being weak at mathematics, while very few admi t that they cannot read or write and they certainly
aren 't proud of this fact, I wonder if this problem can be placed at the door of Albert Einstein. All my life
the idea that you have to be a genius to understand mathematics and physics seems to have been tied to the
fact that only geniuses could understand relativity and other work of Einstein. So my question is this: Did
this popular view that only the gifted few can do mathematics precede Einstein? In other words, did the
annoying phenomenon descr ibed above occ ur back in the year 19OO? Or were "readin' , writin ' and
' rithmetic" equal in those days? I would be interested to know.
Ken Ross
University of Oregon
T
The Language of Mathematics:
A Quantitative Course for a General Audience
StephanieF. Singer
Department of Mathematics
Haverford College
Haverford, Pennsylvania 1904/
The purpose of this article is to convince anyone
with the inclination to design a mathematics
course for a general audie nce that it's worth the
effort and to provide some concrete examples of
successful activities and assignments.
The course I designed and taugh t this year, "The
Language of Mathematics:' was the most
enjoyable class I have taught to date. The
atmosphere was relaxed. The students plunged
whole-heartedly into the in-class problem-solving
in groups of three or four. They were forthcoming
in the class discussions, willing to shareemotional
responses as well as insights from their ow n
experiences and other studies. I attribute the
excellent atmosphere (which I long to recreate in
my more traditional classes) to the daily small
group activities, the absence of a specifi ed body
of material to be mas tered, and the fact that
students were not graded indiv idually on their
problem-solving abilities.
The several goals of the course were: 1) to give
students the opportunity to do some mathematics
in a pressure-free, fun environment; 2) to teach
students to be agressively critical of quantitative
facts presented to them (e.g., by the media); and
3) to help students recognize and become
conversant in the mathematical mode of language
use. This third goal merits some explanation.
There is a particul ar mode of language use
essential to the discussion of mathematics (as well
as other endeavors, such as the sciences and the
law.) The primary feature is lack of ambiguity.
While this mode of language use is as natural as
breathing to mathematici ans, it is extremely
foreign to many people. We love theorems for
their infallibility, but many other people believe
that to every rule there is an exception. We feel
free to use any word we like for any concept, as
long as we define the word clearly, but most
people learn most words from context and from
experience. No wonder , then, that mathema tics is
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viewed as a foreign language by many students-
not only is the voca bulary unfamiliar, but even the
process by which one learns the vocabulary is
different! This problem has been well
documented by Rin, who studi ed linguistic
difficulties experienced by linear algebra students.
The third goal of the course is to help students
recognize that this other mode of using language
exists and is useful.
The class met for one and a half hours twice each
week. There were twenty stude nts from
Haverford College, almost evenly split among
fres hmen, sop homores, j unio rs and seniors.
Fifteen were women. No student was a physical
scie nce or math major. and many described
themselves as " not good at math." They were
graded not on individual problem-solving ability
There is a particular mode of language
use essential to the discussion of
mathematics. The primary feature is
lack of ambiguity. While this mode of
language use is as natural as breathing
to mathematicians, it is extremely
foreign to many people.
but on their class participation and their written
work, described in more detail below. The
dra wbacks of this grading system (e.g.• that
students could get away with failing to understand
some concepts) were well wonh the benefits for
these stude nts .as these unsolicited comments
att est : " After so man y bad math/science
experiences, this was the first class of that son
which I enjoyed;" "Thank you so much for wiping
away a stereotype and an insecurity and a
paranoia co nce rning math-one that' s been
around for me since the very beginning when I
/
was told that I 'didn't think mathematically; tt, and
"It was great to look at math at a different angle
and not to have all the pressure that I usually
associate with math classes:'
The first assignment of the semester (suggested by
Victor Donnay of Bryn Mawr College) was to
write about a good math memory-a memory of
noticing a pattern. I described mowing a
rectangular lawn and noticing the rectangle of
uncut grass in the center switch from skinny to
squarish and back again. Students will have no
trouble finding delightful memories if you give
them encouragement and an example.
To accustom students to doing mathematics in a
relaxed environment, each class began with a
group exercise, either a word problem, a
definition exercise (e.g. , find a verifiable
definition for "vertical") or an estimation
problem. This practice had the added advantage
of focusing the students' attention on the class-
waking and warming them up. (A tip: when
supervising several groups, always have
something up your sleeve for the groups who
finish early.) Some problems came from John
Harte's excellent book, Consider a Spherical
Cow: A Course in Environmental Problem
Solving. One could easily build a course around
this book alone , which attacks serious problems
with algebra, estimation and a sense of humor.
Working through just the first fifteen pages
provided much food for thought and discussion:
orders of magnitude, using physical units,
exponentials and logarithms. Another rich source
of problems was the Shell Centre for
Mathematical Education (University of
Nottingham, NO? 2RD, England). Their
examination modules for secondary schools have
Most important of all is to take
problems from your own local
environment. Ask students to estimate,
e.g., how much money is deposited in the
nearest soda machine each semester.
(among other things) thoughtful and well-
prepared worksheets for group activities. I used
the module called "T he Language of Functions
and Graphs." Most important of all is to take
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problems from your own local environment. Ask:
students to estimate, e.g., how much money is
deposited in the nearest soda machine each
semester. Have them make up their own
estimation problems. You can also throw in some
of the classic old puzzles about coins, flies, water
jugs and people with twin children.
There were two assignments designed specifically
to encourage aggressive criticism of quantitative
facts presented in the media. The first concerned
sneaky ads: Find two advertisements in the press,
on the radio or on television that couch not-so-
impressive quantitative statements in a
misleadingly impressive way. Turn in a copy of
each advertisement Ofyou choose to do a radio or
TV ad you must turn in a tape or an exact
transcript} with a briefexplanation of (1) tile false
conclusion the advertisers hope you will draw and
(2) the rrue meaning ofthe statement.
Students found ads ranging from the heinous
(boldface "0% interest" with fine print detailing
21% interest to be refunded 1 year later in the
form of store credit) to thc silly ("100 free wigs to
100 women who send for our freecatalog'). The
second similarly solicited critiques of quantitative
statements and graphs in newspaper or magazine
articles,
The language issues entered the class explicitly in
two ways. First of all, we spent considerable time
on the concept I have come to call "verifiable
definition." A verifiable definition of a word is a
description of the meaning of the word giving a
category of objects to which the word may apply
and an unambiguous criterion for deciding which
members of the category may be truthfully
described by the word. For example: a person
having two X chromosomes is called female.
Another example: a function is a collection of
pairs of numbers with the following property: if
(a.b) and (a,c) are both in the collection, then b =
c. The categories in these examples are "people"
and "collections of pairs of numbers,"
respectively. This concept is a variation on
Arons' "operational definition:' described in A
Guide to Introductory Physics Teaching, with
more emphasis on lack of ambiguity than on the
nature of the criterion. Students had plenty of
practice finding verifiable definitions (e.g., for
"area", "speed" and "to count"). We discussed
the concept explicitly in class and finally students
wrote essays on what verifiable definitions are,
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when they are usefu l and when they are
inappropriate. Second of all, we focused on
mathematical texts as texts, i.e., as words written
down by one human being in an attempt to
communicate. Over a period of weeks, students
read and compared four very different treatments
of the topic of functions. Any sufficiently varied
treatments would work; I used an old-fashioned
book (Griffin), a product of recent reform
(Hughes-Hallett et al.), a common cookbook
approach (Shenk) and a text stressing rigor
(Spivak). The first assignment of a series was to
react to the texts: First Reaction: skim all four
texts. What do you notice? What do you like?
Dislike? How do they make you/eel? How does
the writing differ from other kinds 0/ writing?
Which has the best pictures? The best typeface?
Criticize! Annotate! Compare and contrast!
Submit a reaction in the medium of your choice
(e.g., words, music, drawing). Be creative!
This first assignment compelled examination of
the texts without requiring comprehension. The
second assignment, designed to teach students a
method for approaching a difficult text, was
assigned repeatedly, with reinforcement from
classroom work and discussions on functions:
Detailed Reaction: Choose one of the/our texts.
For each of the fi rst four new ideas you read,
either (1) give an explanation in your own words
and an illustrative example or (2) describe what it
is you don't understand.
The fin al assignment all owed students to
synthesize and me to eva luate what they had
learned: Compare and Contrast: read the
definition of "f unction" in each of the f our texts.
How do the definitions differ? Are all of the texts
describing the same idea? Discuss the relative
merits of each definition. Judging from student
feedback, a final, unifying class discussion of this
series of assignments would have been helpful.
Other major, graded written work included an
essay on proofs, truth and validity, a proof thaI the
square root of 3 is irrational and an explanation of
where an analogous attempt to prove the square
root of 4 would break down (after discussion of a
proof that the square root of 2 is irrational) and a
few write-ups of problems. There were numerous
minor, ungraded writing ass ignments, mostly
reactions to various readings and write -ups of
problems discussed in class.
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In lieu of an exam, students wrote a final 3-5 page
paper. There were three choices: to investigate
an endeavor that, like mathematics, has
developed a language of its own, to relate ideas
learned in the class to topics of their own
choosing, or to write up several mathematical
proofs (e.g., from exercises in Herstein and
Kaplansky). Students wrote on a variety of
interesting subjects. One paper discussed the
stylized language of African talking drums.
Another proposed an experiment to determine if
students of science and students of the humanities
"Not only have I been given a chance to
understand math, but I was encouraged
to question and explore it. Aspects of
math which had before seemed
inconceivable or illogical began to make
sense."
perform linguistic tasks (such as giving directions
or describing objects) in measurably different
ways.
One student chose to write about his personal
experience in the class; anyone doubting the
worth of such a class should consider this excerpt:
Not only have I been given a chance to
understand math, but I was encouraged to
question and explore it. Aspects of math
which had before seemed inconceivable or
illogical began to make sense. Numbers
which I had always assumed were
infallible were now open to question and
approachable. Imaginary numbers and
non-Euclidean geometries, I found, were
not esoteric inventions of distant brilliant
mathematicians, but actually logical
sys tems which could be explained
concretely with a pencil, ruler, and a piece
of paper, or maybe with an orange. For
me, any number with over three digits was
large and inconceivable, but through
practical estimations and critical reading
of quantitative infonnation I have learned
the discrepancies beween large numbers. I
have also become aware of how easily
they can be manipulated to fool people
like me who when they see more than
3
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three digits do not even take the time to
read the number. The realization that
numbers can be used deceptively and that
they can reveal essential infonnation has
been very beneficial to me. I am more
comfortable, inquisitive , and alen when
handling quantitative information for my
other classes, not to mention in my daily
encounters with numbers. I can even feel
comfortable reading my bank statements.
Anyone wanting fwther information should not
hesitate to contact me.
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Writing Mathematics
E.G. Bernard
Marc Garneau CJ.
135 OverleaBlvd.
Don Mills , Onlario
M3C IB3
All young children, except the most severely
handicapped, possess a language, and can repeat
stories sequentially and in detail after hearing them
a surprisingly few times. People retain these
stories for their whole lives. Vinually all young
children, then, possess the ability to learn a system
of symbolic knowledge. Can techniques from
language experiences assist in the learning and
assessment of mathematics?
In order to attempt an answer to this question, I
visited several mathematics' classes and told the
students that I was going to give them an unusual
mathematics assignment today. First, I'll give you
a non-mathematical example of the assignment and
All young children, except the most
severely handicapped, possess a
language, and can repeat stories
sequentially and in detail after
hearing them a surprisingly few
times. Virtually all young children,
then, possess the ability to learn a
system of symbolic knowledge.
let you try it. We'll discuss and take up aspects of
this assignment. Second, I'll give you the
mathematical assignment. Third, I'll return in a
few days, take up the assignment. explain to you
what I'm trying to accomplish, and solicit your
views.
I'm going to put two non-mathematical expressions
on the board. When you see two expressions. I
want you to tell me the content (the story) that you
associate with these two expressions.
Here are the two expressions: glass slipper and
pumpkin.
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Now, tell me the content (the story) that you
associate with these two expressions. (Teachers
may have to use other examples depending upon
the cultural backgrounds of their studeolS.)
Most students said these expressions refer to the
story of Cinderella. When asked to commence
telling the story, most students began "Once uJXXl a
time", and were able to tell the story. I pointed
out, that although they had likely not heard this
story for a long time, they had an amazing amount
of correct detail in their stories and the content of
their stories was well sequenced.
Now for the mathematics assignment. This time I
will put a title on the board, and you write the
story. (The classes I visited had recently
completed their study of fractions , and I had the
students' names and scores on their fraction tests.)
The differences between addin~ and multiplyin~
fractions.
Remember the Writing Process in your English
classes. List the appropriate content, that is. what
you know about the title, sequence the content. and
write out a fiill account of the story. Give a lot of
detail. Use only words.
When I read the stories, many students employed
introductory and concluding sentences. For
instance. "There are a few differences between the
addition and multiplication of fractions.... These
are the differences between the addition and
multiplication of fractions."
In a few cases, students incorporated their content
into a traditional type of story. For instance. "Once
upon a time there was a boy named Bob who
didn 't know how to do fractions. His friend
helped him after school one day.... Bob finally
understood how to do fractions , and passed his
fraction test." In another version, the conclusion
stated, "and the boy not only passed his next
5
fraction test, years later he becamea Math teacher! '
And in another case, "Adding and Multiplying
were talking to each other one day. Adding asked
Multiplying to tell how he is different from Adding
regarding fractions. ... Well , although we both
deal with numbers, we are different in many
ways."
I had prepared a marking scheme prior to
administering these assignments. I awarded marks
for the title being present, for an introductory
sentence with a bonus for a creative introduction,
for a conclusion, and for spelling, grammar, and
writing style. In marking the content of the
addition of fractions, I was looking for some
discussion of finding a common denominator, of
adding the numerators, and placing the sum of the
numerators over the common denominator. In
marking the multiplication of fractions, I was
looking for a description of multiplying the
numerators together, and placing this product over
the product of the denominators. I also awarded
marks for a reference to reducing answers to their
lowest terms, of dividing in the mulriplication of
fractions to reduce the size of the numbers, a
reference to the order of operation s, and a
discussion of dealing with mixed nwnbers.
As many as forty percent of the students' marks
increased on this assignment over their marks on
traditional fraction tests, and many substantially,
for instance: 37 to 65, 23 1045, 63 to 80, and 72 to
100. Some of the students received marks similar
to their marks on the traditional fraction tests. As
many as forty percent of the students ' marks
decreased, for instance: 71 to 60, 60 to 35, 53 to
Hl, and 63 to 0. Most of the students whose
marks decreased were New Canadians; they were
unable to describe or write about mathematical
operations albeit some of them scored higher on the
traditional types of tests.
I beli eve tha t exercises of this type offe r
opportunities for many students to exhibit
knowledge not requested in traditional mathematics
tests. It is important in all subject areas that we
employ a variety of types of questions, and a
variety of types of evaluation instruments in order
to meet the various talents of each of our students,
and to allow students to be successful in some area
of each course. For instance, in visual arts courses
students are not evaluated in only one medium.
Various media are explored, for insta nce,
sketching, watercolours, oil, charcoal, clay, etc. as
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well as an history, and the greater the variety, the
more likely we will match an aspect of the course
with a talent of a student. Consequently, in
mathematics, we should employ the traditional
types of testing as well as assignments of the type I
am suggesting in this paper in order to meet the
variety of talents that students possess.
The business-world and post-secondary schools
want graduates who can communicate clearly and
creatively. They appear to want young people who
can describe as well as apply what they know. If
this is true, then a student who can apply theory
and articulate it clearly should score higher than
someone who can only perform the calculations
properly. If writing mathematics is an important
aspect in understandingand reporting mathematical
concepts, then I hope this paper may point to a way
of commencing this activity in our classrooms.
When I returned to the classes in order to take up
the assignments, to explain what I was attempting
to do, and to solicit the students' views, I
discussed how very young children, except the
most seve rely handicapped, have learned a
language and stories. In fact, it is amazing how a
young child can repeat a story, such as, Cinderella,
after hearing it a surprisingly few times. You have
It is important in all subject areas
that we employ a variety of types of
questions, and a variety of types of
evaluation instruments in order to
meet the various talents of each of
our students, and to allow students
to be successful in some area of
each course.
heard the story of fractions many more times than
you heard the story of Cinderella, and you have
heard about frac tions more recently than
Cinderella. You should be able to describe
operations involving fractions. Some students
said, but there was no pressure or expectation to
learn Cinderella at our mothers' knees, and at the
time, Cinderella was interesting to us. Fractions
(or mathematics in general) is not interesting to
many of us. These students have pointed out the
very basis for commencing this type of exercise
(writing mathematics) at a much earlier stage in the
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educational process. I explained to them that I was
seeking additional methods for assessing students
in mathematics. Some students thought that
seekin g additional assessme nt methods in
mathematics was a good idea. Others, of co urse,
did not like this idea. Some students recalled that
they had been asked in the past to write about how
Topics in Mathematics need to be
presente d in an overvi ew rather
than in isolated pieces. By learning
(or seeing) the whole story,
association and sequence are
present.
they felt after writing a math test, and some said
that they had beenasked to write poetty concerning
their experiences in mathematics.
In order to implement " Writing Mathematics" I
believe we need some applications in learning and
assessing mathematics which arise from learning
language and stories.
• In learning languages and stories, we give
countless examples of how words are used.
In Mathematics, we need to give countless
examples of how numbers are used. Further,
we need to give examples of applications, for
in stance, from Science. Technology.
Computer Studies, Sports, Geography,
Business, and so on.
• I suggest that topics in Mathematics need to
be presented in an overview rather than in
isolated pieces . Language and stories are
learned holi stically. We did not learn
Cinderella by hearing bits of the story now
and then, and out of sequence. By learning
(or seeing) the whole story, associa tion and
sequence are present. Association and
sequence are two aspects of what is meant by
the material having "meaning", of not being
like nonsense syllables. There is a lot of
research on the amount of time and effort
required to learn nonsense syllables as
opposed to learning meaningful material.
Nonsense syllables are learned more slowly
(research suggests that four times the effort is
required ), and are quickly forgotten. Does
HMNJournal #9
Mathematics come across as nonsense
syllables to somechildren?
In mathematics, we can go back laterand deal
with difficult points in isolation, rather than
teaching the whole topic in a series of isolated
points. I suggest that we need to present the
"whole fraction story": what are fractions,
examples of what fractions look like, how
fractions are used, pictures of pieces of pie,
the partsof a fraction named and labelled, the
four operations as they apply to fractions
noting the similarities and differences anx>ng
the opera tions, examples of the four
operations, and so on. As well as association
and seque nce being present in this
methodology, students would have the whole
story of fractions in their notes in one place
for study purposes.
• Pan of the testing in Mathematics, then.
should include the natural questioning which
is used in evaluating language and stories as
well as the traditional means of testing.
• Assignments and assessment in Mathematics
need to involve great variety,and not just
textbook-like questions. For instance, in
introductory Geometry, assignments and
assessment need to include problem-solving,
research, writing, conceptual knowledge.
aesthetics. and so on. These attributes can be
met through learning the shapes, learning the
parts of each shape, labelling, learning
perimeter, area , and volume, applying the
formulae to perimeter, area, and volume
creating mobiles of shapes, researching these
shapes as they appear in nature, writing the
story of, say, Area, the use of computers in
generating these shapes, estimation of widths
of rivers and heights of trees, and so on.
• The common elements of "problem-solving"
need to be discussed noting that there are
often more ways than one to solve problems.
The learning style of each student may mean
that each student prefers one way over
another.
• One very important method of learning in the
Humanities involves a student asking
questions prior to commencing a topic. and
then having his own questions answered
during his readings. We remember the
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answers to our own questions better than we
remember the answers to someone else' s (the
teacher' s) question s. For instance, if we
were about to study the American Civil War,
we might ask what are the dates of the war,
who were the leaders of both sides, what
were the two sides, how did the war start,
what were the causes, what was the first
battle, what were the major battles. what was
the last battle. who were the generals. who
won. reasons for the outcome, what was
going on in the world at the time of this war.
does anyone really win a war, what are the
effects of the war immediately after, and
today. are there any feelings about the war
still present in America, and so on.
As a person reads about a topic, new questions will
arise. As a person has more experience asking his
own questions, he will get better at asking
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questions prior to commencing a topic, and thus,
will get better at remembering significant details
about a topic.
In the case of introducing fractions: what are
fractions, what does the word fraction mean, can
you add, subtract, multiply and divide fractions,
what are the rules for these operations with
fractions. what are some applications of fractions,
how are fracti ons used, what new vocabulary
arises from the study of fractions, is there a
relationship between fractions and decimals, and
fractions and percent, and so on.
If there is a genn of an idea in this paper, I suspect
each reader will be able to add many other
applications. I would be very glad to hear from
you concerning new applications that you can make
to this idea.
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Mathematics and the Arts:
Taking Their Resemblances Seriously
FrederickReiner
The Key School
Annapolis, Maryland 21403
[Though] mathematics is often excluded from the arts....such exclusion does not justify
denial or neglect of the respects in which litl resembles the arts wedo recognize.
- Francis Sparshott
[53. pp. 145-146)
The above comment from a poet and philosopher
expresse s an attit ude wi th which ma ny
mathematicians would probably feel comfortable.
From at least the time of Aris totle, writers of
various philosophical stripes have paid tribute to
the aesthetic appeal of mathematical studies, and
today there ex ists a co nside rab le body of
introspective literature on the affinities between
mathematics and the arts. Certainly the readers of a
journal devoted to humanistic mathematics should
sympathize with any reaffirmation of their subject's
For example, if we claim aesthetic
values are inherent to our doing
mathematics, can we in any way
specify what those values are or the
role they play in our practice?
place among creative human activities . Indeed, to
some Sparshott's remark is surely overcaut ious:
Isn't mathematics already an art?
I believe, however, that we should treat
Sparshott ' s comment more as a suggestion than as
another (and actual ly rather weak) tribute to the
aesthetic nature of our subject By virtue of its not
assuming mathematics to be an art it encourages us
to speculate on the issue. The results of such
speculation may well be fresh insights into the
nature of mathematics, its role among human
endeavors, and even the manner in which
mathematics education should proceed.
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To see thi s, consider the extent to which the
dominant mathematical philosophy of formali sm
concentrates on the rigorou s, analytic structure of
theories and results as opposed to the complex,
creative and often downright hazy methods by
which these results are obtained. In the eyes of
formalism this is not merely a matter of
emphas is-the latter notions are intentionally
brushed aside as irrelelvent to the question "What
is mathematics?" (see, e.g., [HI ]). Can such an
approach poss ibly be consistent with the belief that
mathematics fundamentally engages our aesthetic
Interests, or that il proceeds in manners akin to
those of art? If we truly feel these things about
mathematics, why do we cleave to a philo sophy
and to practices that deny them?
Thus what I see Sparshott suggesting is that we
take our generally unexamined beliefs on this issue
and examine them seriously. For example, if we
claim aes thetic values are inherent to our doing
mathematics, can we in any way speci fy what
those values are or the role they play in our
practice? If we claim mathematics to be an an by
virtue of entailing properties X, Y and Z. are we
prepared to counter the charges that with regard to
an itself, X is irrelevent, Y insuffucient or Z
actually antithetical? Do we know what an is any
more than we know what mathematics is? To
answer questions like these--even just to ask them
intelligently-requires a depth of analysis which
few from either the aesthetics/art or mathematics
sides of the issue have attempted.
While I make no claim of attaining such a depth in
what follows, I do hope I can indicate something
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of what is likely to be involved in the attempt, and
where some of the benefits to be obtained by the
effon may lie.
Aesthetics. Art and Mathematics
In keeping with a practice all too common among
writers on this issue, I have thus far been using
two different terms-art and aesthetics-in a
dangerou sly synonymous way. It is time for a
distinction. By aesthetics I mean the particular type
of inquiry that Scruton [52, p. 15] characterizes as
the "philosop hic stud y of beauty and taste."
Similarly, by "aesthetic" I refer either to an attribute
suc h an inqu iry would study (e.g., aesthet ic
distance) or to some sys tem that embraces these
notions in a particular way (e.g., a culture or era
with an aesthetic different from our own).
An, on the other hand, is a trickier notion with
which to come to grips. Too complex to take as a
primitive term, it is one of those concepts-like
mathematics itselt!-for which we seem to have
enough of a sense to use with impunity and still be
Like the philosopher of art, we are
not so interested in developing the
concepts of beauty and taste per se
as we are in applying these to a
particular-though very broad-
type of activity,
underst ood- at le ast among people with
backgrounds similar to our own. Yet a careful
delineation of the concept always seems beyond
our grasp. Perhaps we might regard this as good
enough, but nagging questions of considerable
import nevenheless keep arising: Is such-and- such
a wonhy enough work of an to merit our attention?
Does its maker merit our support? Should an itself
be publi cally supported? Should it be taught in
schools? Can it be taught at all ? As might be
expected, the closer we get to the "edges" of the
concept- to education, to ethics, to the boundaries
of "non-art"-the tougher the questions get.
Hence arises the philosophy of art.
Al though historical precedents for confusion are
ample, it is almost cenainly mistaken to equate this
laner field with aesthetics [see 54, pp. 15-16]. The
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philosopher of art may well be concerned with
questions of ontology (What is a work of an? A
physical object? A mental state?), epistemology (Is
there such a thing as artistic knowledge? What is it
knowledge of? Is it somehow veriflable'f) or ethics
(Can a work of an be morally neutral? Does its
carryin g any particular moral value affect its status
as an?). Th ese are concerns whose connection
with aesthetics proper is not entirely clear.
Conversely, the aesthetician may well be interested
in our responses to nature or to dreams, or to the
incidents of our daily lives. One may argue that an
is broad enough to embrace these notions as well ,
but this is certainly something to be demonstrated
and not assumed.
So wher~ doe s thi s put us with regard to
mathematics? Ideally, we might wish to establish a
relationship between aesthetics and the philo sophy
of math emati c s analogous to that between
aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Problems
immediately arise, however. On the one hand,
many of the concepts of aesthetics have developed
(even if controversially so) with specific reference
to an, and applying these as they now stand to
mathematics may be unwarranted. But even more
troublesome difficulties arise from the side of the
philosophy of mathematics itself, which in this
century has so estranged itself from aesthetic
concerns that prospects for an immediate dialogue
seem dim. The two disciplines apparently lack a
common language.
It is here that we might appeal to the philosophy of
art. Like the philosopher of an, we are not so
interested in developing the concepts of beauty and
taste per se as we are in applying these to a
parti cular-though very broad-type of activity.
Similarly, we should be willing to admit that the
most important aspects of our subject may well lie
outside the realm of aesthetics. Finally, we can
note from the stan that several important concepts
in the philosophy of art (e.g., representation, form,
the distinction between pure and applied activities)
bear prima facie resemblance with concepts in
mathematics. Possibly this is no more than a
superficial coincidence, but again this is a point
requiring demonstration. (I suspect that in many
instances the coincidence is not superficial .) In
keeping with the sense of Sparshon's suggestion,
we should compare mathematics and an before we
even consider equating them. We may even find
that such an equation may be the least illuminating
of the insights we gain.
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Essentialist Theories
Traditional attempts to formulate philosophies of
art have largely focused on the que stion of
definition-of finding those qualities which
uniquelyconstitute the essence of art. As DeWitt
Parker stated in an influential article from 1939:
The assumption underlying every
philosophy of art is the existence of some
common nature present in all the
arts....There is some...set of marks which,
if it applies to any work, applies to all
works of art, and to nothing el se....{This]
constitutes the definition of an. [P2. p. 61]
Note that this essentialist approach-that of
reducing art to necessary and sufficient
conditions-promises a result not unlike those
formulas for the identity of mathematics (e.g.,
"Mathematics is logic". or "Mathematics is the
study of formal systems") that have arisen in our
own field. The resemblance is deeper than thi s,
however. The very attempts to specify these
qualities in each subject have themselves paralleled
each other in remarkable and significant manners.
Although any atte mpt to classify diverse theories
runs the risk of oversimpl ification, I shall deal here
with three general forms of essentialist arguments.
The first, realism, involves identifying this essence
Leonardo declared that, "Truly
painting is a science, the true born
child of nature" and some three
centuries later the landscapist
Constable reaffirmed: "Painting is a
science, and should be pursued as an
inquiry into the laws of Nature."
in some relationship between a constructed object
(or "artifact" ) and a world exterior both to that
objec t and its maker. By contrast, expressioni sm
concentrates on relationships between the artifact
and a world interior to either its maker, audience or
both. Fin ally, formalism identifies the essence of
art strictly in terms of qualities contained within the
artifact itself-e.g., the lines , colors or shapes in a
painting, the arrangem ent of tones in a musical
composition, etc.
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I do not wish to imply that all essentialist theories
fit snugly into these categories. Hybrid theories
combining elements from each of these also exist.
as do theories that strike otTin different. often quite
sophisticated and radical, directions (see, e.g.,
[Til & [D3]). For introductory purposes,
however, this scheme (which parallels that of
[H5]) should be adequate, and will also serve to
highlight the paralle ls between traditional
philosophies of an and mathematics. Let us briefly
consider each in turn.
Realism
For centuries realistic views had constituted the
dominant theories of an, and although these
attitudes have generally fallen from favor, both
artists and audiences alike continue to beinfluenced
by their appeal. While a broad spectrum of realistic
views are possible, these theories in general
identify art as a system of knowledge with a status
claim not entirely unlike that of science. Most
explicitly, Leonardo declared that, "Truly painting
is a science, the true born child of nature" and
some three centuries later the landscapist Constable
reaffirmed: "Painting is a science, and should be
pursued as an inquiry into the laws of Nature." By
these lights (which can be clearly discerned in the
works of Aristotle), the arti st reveals reality to us
through ab stract representations of its various
aspects-aspects incapable of such revelation by
any means but art . In some variations of the
theory, these revelations are actually of a "higher"
plane of reality than mere physical existence. For
example, Piet Mondrian viewed his skeletal
arrangements of lines and solid colors as
presenting ima ges of "true reality and true life," a
position more akin to nee-Platonism than the
indu ctive reali sm of Ari stotle. These views are
linked, however, by a conception of art as
essentially a means of discovering truth.
Have attitudes such as these ever been displayed
toward our mathematical "artifacts," and are they
still likely to exert an influence on us today? To
both questions the answers are definitely yes. For
centuries Euclidean geometry did not stand as one
of a multitude of formal geometric systems but was
regarded as representing the Real geometry of Real
Space, based on inductively self-evident truths
abstracted from reality and developed through the
unassailable method of deduction. (Writing before
Eucl id, Aristotle accurately observed some of the
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consequences of rejecting the assertion that the sum
of the angles in any triangle was two right angles.
He abandoned these conclusions because of their
"obvious" inability to square with the evidence of
experience. Spherical geometry, of course. had
already developed a long history, but this was Real
geometry on a Real surfaco--not a model of a non-
Euclidean system. See [T3J.) True, the insistence
upon logical deduction may appear outwardly to be
difficult to reconcile with an, but I believe this
percepti on largely arises from simultaneous
tendencies to downp lay the role of logical
development in an and to overplay its role in
mathematics. The logical "flaws" in Euclid 's
geometry or Newton' s calculus were recognized as
profoundly troublesome, but these problems were
as little compared to the practical insights and
successes the systems as a whole presented (see
[KIl). The knowledge gleaned from mathematics
was looke d upon as genuine knowledge
nonetheless, and throughout this period there was
little doubt that this knowledge was that of reality.
The rise of non-Euclidean geometry required
abandonment of this geometry-as-the-science-of-
real-space conception, but by no means did it spell
the end of realist conceptions of mathematics. By
one view. different geometries or systems of
mathematics could be conceived as separate entities
of a Platonic world of forms , with the
mathematician regarded as a sort of suprascientist
who discovers the properties of these entities. And
Thus while we may be accustomed
to referring to the Mona Lisa itself
as a work of art, the work of art
proper lies in the imaginative
constructions that resulted in
Leonardo's painting it and in our
interpreting it.
although this position ignores seve ral not
inconsiderable aspects of Plato ' s thought on
mathematics, the belief that any well-framed
mathematical question has a definite answer
independent of our existence characterizes the
posit ion known as mathematical Platonism.
Phrased in this manner, the position becomes as
much the creed of a mathematical theology as it
does the basis of a descriptive philosophy. As the
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former it seems to be of practical value to
individual mathematicians [see. e.g., TI]; as a
critical theory it seems as suspect as Mondrian's
supposed ability to envision "true reality." Did art
experience its own "non-Euclideanrevolution?" In
a sense it did, even if its occurence cannot be as
prec isely specified as that of mathematics.
(Although the late-18th and early-19th centuries
figure prominently in the revolutions in both fields.
See [AI].) The process in this case involved-at
least in pan-the realization that representation
itself was neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for art. Its insufficiency (long
recogni zed) can be ascertained simply by
considering common occurences of representation
that do not qualify as art: courtroom records,
plastic anatomical models, or snapshots (the
history of photography's status as an art provides
an interesting trial case of realistic theories). But
even more telling is the apparent case for
unnecessity. Not only do non-representational
artworks exist. but entire branches of art appear to
be non-representational by nature. Debussy's La
Mer may be taken to represent the sea, but does not
this conclusion follow primarily by virtue of the
work's title alone? Without this title. would the
work still be perceived as resembling the sea more
than it does anything else? Would we even
consider the work in representational terms?
Would we still consider it a work of an? (For this
example see [H5, p. 708J.)
Emile Zola-one of the late 19th century's most
prominent exponents of realism through his ideal
of the naturali stic "experimental novel"-once
characterized art as life seen through a
"temperment." But even from before the time of
Zola it had become increasingly apparent that
realistic theories had been in error in not placing
more emphasis on the role of this "ternperment"
itself. In the philosophies of expressionism this
role would lie at the very heart of the matter.
Expressionism
For an example of an extreme expressionist view.
consider the theory developed in the first half of
this century by the philosophers Benedetto Croce
[C2J and R. G. Collingwood [CI). (These are
actually separate theories, but close enough in both
spirit and detail to be regarded as one for our
purposes.) In this theory an is taken as being
identical with expression. the revealing of an
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internally construc ted mental state. Even more
simply. art is realized imaginative activity. and in
fact stands as the most basic fonn of human
language. Although this is a panicularly broad
pronouncement. it is accompanied by explicit
statements of what an is not. First (and possibly
most difficult ly) it is not any set of existing
physical or symbolic art ifacts such as paintings.
texts or sculpture s. These are simply the necessary
embodiments of the imaginative constructions that
Collingwood calls the "work[s] of an proper" [CI,
p. 37]. Thus while we may be accustomed to
referring to the Mona Lisa itself as a work of art,
the work of art proper lie s in the imaginative
constructions that resulted in Leonardo's painting it
and in our interpreting it. (Along the se line s
Collin gwood approvingly quotes Coleridge 's "we
know a man for a poet by the fact that he makes us
poets" [CI, p. 1I 8J.) Similarly, an should nOI be
confused with any particular kinds of media.
These. rather, are simply the necessary channels
through which particular expressions flow. (Again
from CoIlingwood: "Every gesture that each one of
us makes is a work of an" [C I, p. 285]) Finally,
art should not be ide ntified with any activity
engaged in for a specific purpose or outcome. Art
may be used to represent reality, entertain us or
persuade us, but it does these things en passant ,
Indeed. if any specific purpose guides the
production of a work we are dea ling not with an at
all, but with craft or techno-what Collingwood
calls "an falsely so-called."
This last may seem to place art in a paradoxical
position. On the one hand it is equivalent to the
most basic human attribute (communication) and
on the other it is divorced from purposive human
activiti es. This is resolved through the nature of
the internal constructions of emotions, intuitions
an d ex periences that re sult in successful
expressions. Colli ngwood explains that to attain
these the arti st mu st "experience what all
experience" and commen ts that " in ivory towers art
lan guished" [CI , p . 119] . Similar ly, Croce
disposes of the romantic no tion of the artist as
necessari ly being a specimen of genius (a view
which also haunts mathematics) by not ing that
"inspiration is not something from heaven, but is in
the essence of humanity itself." and that «the man
of genius who poses as that...finds his punishment
in becoming somew hat ridiculous" [C2, p. 16]. In
this theory arti sts are born and not made , but we
are all born artists. Differences are of degree, not
of kind .
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It may seem unlikely that there could be an overall
view of mathemat ics correspo nding to an
expressionist theory of art-particularly a theory as
extreme as that of Croce and Collingwood. It is
somewhat startl ing to find. therefore. that it is not
difficult to find particular passages in these writer ' s
works which are virtually identical to ones found in
the work of such figures as poincare. Brouwer and
it is above all mistaken to confuse
matbematics with its final symbolic
forms, These, rather, are merely
the manifestations of the internal
constructive processes that
constitute the proper identity of
mathematics.
late r members of the constructivist school.
Consider Brouwer's intuitionism [B]. To Brouwer
it is above all mistaken to confuse mathematics
with its final symbolic fonns. These. rather, are
merel y the manifest at ions of the internal
construc tive processes that constitute the proper
identity of mathematics. Other mathematicians may
use their interpretation of these symbols as a basis
for their own constructions, but their interpretation
is itself a personal construction. (Sparshott notes
that both he and H. S. M. Coxeter know the
Pythagorean theorem, but that what "he knows in
knowin g it is something I cannot even imagine"
[S4, p. 33].) To Brouwer, logical rules do not
guide the process of mathematical construction;
rather. a pragmatic logic is effectively created along
the way. Similarly, Collingwood notes that the
artist does not create rules so much as construct
them. These viewpoints do not leave judgements
in either activity purely subjective. however. In
mathematics, such judgements are constrained by
the requirement of constructive existence; in art by
the conunonality of actual human experience. Even
on the point where the theories apparently diverge
most severely- the conception of language-the
difficulty reduces to a difference in terminology .
Croc e and ColHn gwood conclude that art is
language, whereas Brouwer vinually declares that
mathematics is anything but language. But to
Collingwood, language is any expression of
intern al constructions; to Brou wer language is
primarily sym bolic notation (which Collingwood
refers to as "lan guage falsely so-called" and Croce
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as " the mere grammatical").
Though these theories may assumedifferent names
in different fields-expressionism in art,
intuitioni sm or constructivism in mathematics-all
share a focus upon the freedom and constraints of
the creative process as essential to the activity at
hand. In an. expressionism has been particularly
cri ticized for its apparen t disregard for the arti stic
product as an entity onto itself-the theory' s notion
of art istic exi stence appears skewed [H4}.
Similarly, mathematical constructivism establi shes
a criterion of existence often viewed as
unnecessari ly severe ([ill]). In response to the se
charges in both areas , philosophies of fonnalism---
already present in each field-have arisen as
alternatives.
Formalism
Whether in mathematics or in art. formalism in its
purest state is a philosophy of detachment.
Artworks and mathematical systems are viewed as
independent phenomena standing apan from their
creators, their audiences and any external world.
Meanings or values can be considered only with
reference to elements contained within the work
itself. And although ideal formalist criticism may
be diffi cult to achieve in practice, in that ideal
works stand apart even from the history of their
very construct ion. As Werhane puts it, a work
exi sts virtually " in spite of its creator...and its
audience" [W4, p. 99J .
I should make at least one distinction among formal
theories, however-particularly with respect to an.
In the pure state described above-a position
sometimes referred to as absolutism-the meaning
of a work is entirely separated from any quality not
within the work itself. Thus to recognize a work
of an is to recognize such qualities as symmetry,
internal dynamics or the relationships of color and
shape; to create an is to impose these qualities on
an artifac t. How ever, in another brand of
formalism it is important that one look at both the
formal structure of a work as well as any meanings
that may be expressed by that struc ture. Art
effectively becomes defined as symbolic fonn. BUI
unless one wishes to regard virtuall y everything
from everyday language through, say, mathematics
as art . a more precise descriptio n of what
constitutes artistic forms is needed. Such
theories-as for example those of Suzanne K.
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Langer IL] or Nelson Goodman [02]---<:volve
largely into "meta-theories" of syntactic and
semantic rules , and thus to a large extent diverge
from pure formali sm, Simultaneously, however,
they also seem to diverge from the actual
experi ence of creating and appreciating an.
Wri ting with regard to Langer's theory, Scruton
comments that her "analysis gives no procedure for
Whether in mathematics or in art,
formalism in its purest state is a
philosophy of detachment.
Artworks and mathematical systems
are viewed as independent
phenomena standing apart from
their creators, their audiences and
any external world,
interpretation, nothing that would give application
to the claim that in understanding a work of art we
understand it as a sym bol" [52, p. 22].
In mathematics, pure fonnalism---comparable to
aesthetic absolutism-is that view which takes
mathematics to be strictly the study of formal
systems (see [HI]). Where the formalist in art
seeks internal structure, the mathematical formalist
seeks consistency. Where the former detaches
meaning or expression from form. the latter
constructs "uninterpreted" systems.
I feel compelled here to mention that Hilbert (the
"father of formalism") was not a formalist in this
sense, as his introduction to Geometry and the
Imagination [H3] makes abundantly clear. The
metamathematical strategy of Hilbert's Program
required him to treat mathematical systems as
uninterpreted for the sake of a consistency proof-
hardly the same as believing mathematics itself to
be fundamentally uninterpretable or meaningless.
Curry, one of the leading exponents of
mathematical formalism, has himself stated that "it
is unfortunate that many persons identify
fonna1ism with what should be called Hilbertism"
[C3, p. 156]. Indeed, it would be interesting to
determi ne the degree to which the aims and
methods of metamathematics in general parallel
those of, say. Goodman's strategy in Languages of
Art [02J.
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In both mathematics and art formalism has become
the most established theoretic view of this century.
(In both fie lds , in fact, it has independently
acquired the descriptive phrase "Modernism.'} In
mathematics education, its influence-under the
pervasive guidance of Bourbaki and the New
Math-has been nearly universal. However, as
Davis and Hersh ([D4, pp. 343-344]) note, cracks
have begun to show in the formalist wall. The
underlying theme of both [D4] and [D5] is in
essence an assa ult on mathematical formali sm, as
are the selections in [T4]. Similarly, many of the
es says in Arthur Dante ' s recent collecti on [D2]
constitute strong cases against aesthetic formali sm
and its sep aration from human experience and
meaning.
Non-Essentialism
In an often anthologized paper, "The Role of
Theory in Aesthetics" [WI] the philosopher Morris
Weitz argued that the entire essentialist approach to
the philosophy of an is fundamentally misguided
(see also [W3] for an elaboration). To Weitz, an is
an example of what he call s an inherently
undefineable open concept. He develops this more
fully by referring to what he calls the perreniel
flexibility and debatability of art. Art is perennially
In mathematics, pure formalism-
comparable to aesthetic
absolutism-is that view which
takes mathematics to be strictly the
study of formal systems. Where the
formalist in art seeks internal
structure, the mathematical
formalist seeks consistency.
flexible in that it is always capable of expanding its
sc ope to embrace previou sly unconsidered
artifacts, styles , media, e tc. It is perenially
debatable in that not only are the criteria by which
new works are judged subject to continual criticism
and reevalu at ion , but even establi shed works
continue to fall under such scrutiny. Oed ipus Rex
may be established as a masterpiece of tragedy, but
the matter of exac tly which of its qualities grant it
that status continues to be contentious.
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Weitz bases his discussion in Wingenstein's notion
of family resemblance [W5, pp. 31-331_ To use
Wittgenstein's example, if we are confronted with
the question "What is a game?" we shall find
ourselves unable to provide a satisfactory set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Not all games
have rules, not all involve competition, not all are
purely recreational, etc. What we can do is point
out resemblances between those entitities which we
have chosen to call games. If a new candidate for
gamehood presents itself, we base our decision
whether to expand the concept to embrace it on the
resemblances we perceive between the new activity
and those previously admitted. Weitz notes that
with regard to an we could always choose to "close
the concept" by legislating strict standards of
admittance, but to do so would, as he puts it,
"foreclose on creativity"-a seemingly self-
defeating decision.
This last approach-that of choosing to close the
concept-is the option foundational philosophies
of mathematics seem to offer. But when
mathematics is regarded primarily as an activity
(i.e.. historically, culturally and in actual practice)
this option as well seems to be a particularly self-
defeating decision. Viewed this way, in fact.
mathematics increasingly presents itself as a
flexible and debatable open concept. As an
example, consider the attitudes mathematicians
have historically held regarding the existence of
infinitesimal s. Does the long history of this issue
between the times of Eudoxus and modem non-
standard analysis suggest anything but the
perennial flexibility and debatabiliry of this
concept? What of "dimension," "continuity," or
"real number?" Perhaps most teIlingly. consider
the notion of "proof." Is this a closed concept, or
have our criteria of what constitutes a valid
mathematical argument themselves been (and
continue to be) flexible and debatable? Consider
the positions available with regard to the use of
computers in proof. Tymockzo [T4, pp. 243-266]
asks whether if we regard the a-color theorem as
having been proved. must we not also admit that its
proof is of an entirely different nature from any that
have come before it?
Although Weitz considers essentalist arguments to
be misguided in purpose, he does not consider the
particular issues they raise to be irrelevant. These
theories provide, in fact, "a series of
invaluable...directions for attending to art," and
concludes that:
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If we take aesthetic theori es literally...they
all fail; bur if we reconstrue them, in terms
of function and point. ..as recommendations
to concentrate on certain criteria [they are]
far from wonhless. [They] teach us what
to look at in art. ([W I]. p. 156)
Similarly. if we demand of our philosophies of
mathematics a sec ure foundation capable of
supporting the entire struc ture of the subject we
may well be fundamentally misguided. However,
foundational philosophies have been successful in
raising relevant issues and thereby provoking us to
fresh insights. In both art and mathematics, non-
essentialism move s us toward a pluralistic view of
our endeavors, one that recognizes that there is not
a single, absolute perspective but many-possibly
not even mutually consistent- viewpoints. By no
means, however, should pluralism be confused
with a kind of bland eclecticism or---even worse--
blind subjectivism. On the contrary. the holding of
finn ind ividual views is probably necessary to
create the productive tensions that dri ve ou r
activ ities as a whole. One can be generally non-
pluralist with regard to one 's own philosophy and
generally pluralist with regard to mathematics or an
as a whole. (For a discussion of this stance with
regard to an see Danto 's "Learning to Live with
Pluralism" in [02]).
The recognition of both an and mathe matics as
open concepts leaves behind it a curious casuality.
The claim that mathematics is an an seems to have
lost its meaning. But in its place has arisen the
prospect of a much more active agenda-that of
seeking family resemblances between the two
fields. That any resemblances we find are indeed
familial ones I do not find objectionable-e-rhe
underlying conceptions of the essenti alist theories
in each fiel d just ifies their membershi p in a
common philosophical "family." In the remainder
of this article] would like to address just a few of
the areas where some useful resemblances of this
kind might be sought.
Family Resemblances between Art
and Mathematics
Mathematics and Techne
One of the central points in the Croce-Collingwood
theory is the distinction between art and techne, or
craft. Rec all that in this theory the form er is
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equivalent to expression, while the latter is
identified with activities engaged in to attain a
specific result Even without wholly accepting this
theory, the desire for such a distinction seems
desirable. Techne is composed of specific,
trainable skills; an not only marshals these skills.
but transcends them in some not clearly defmeable
manner. Mixing paints or mastering scales is
techne; The Madonna of the Rocks or an original
jazz improvisation is art. Propaganda as
propaganda is tecbne; propaganda in the fonn of
Eisenstein's Potemkin somehow becomes art.
A similar distinction seems valid in mathematics,
and could well be crucial in education. Finding the
greatest common divisor of two numbers through
following some recipe is techne; deriving a process
along the lines of Euclid's algorithm, convincing
oneself and others that it works, or deve loping a
geometric interpretation of it (in short,
understanding it) is mathematics. Even a brief
peru sal of most secondary level textbooks or
examin ations reve als a tremendous emphasis on
techne. But to what degree are " skills" nonetheless
necessary , and which particular ones? Can and
should these be approached in a more
"mathematical" manner? If mathematics proper is
something that cannot bedirectly taught. how can it
In both art and mathematics, non-
essentialism moves us toward a
pluralistic view of our endeavors,
one that recognizes that there is not
a single, absolute perspective but
many-possibly not even mutually
consistent-viewpoints,
be productively devel oped? Approaching these
issue s seems to require a sharper disitnction
between " math proper" and "math fal sely so-
called" than now exists. (Consider: To what
degree is formal proof a matter of techne '1 Is much
of the "mathematics proper" completed by the rime
we reach this stage?)
A final open note on this subject: The mathltechne
di stinction appe ars to cut across that of
pure/applied mathematics, and in certain respects
may prove to be more a fruitful one. Consider
architecture. Is this pure or applied art? Is it art or
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techne? Which question gives us a more useful
perspective in contrasting Frank Lloyd Wright ' s
Fallingwater with tract housing? Now what of.
say, the theory of relativity, or the activity of
mathematicalmodelling?
Style
Among the most perplexing questions concerning
the nature and history of art are those involving the
issue of style. Why have diffe rent individual
artists. or the artists of different cultures, nations
and ages represented the world in such different
ways? How is it even possible for them to have
done so, and then for others to be able to recognize
and apprec iate their works? How do es an
approach to these issues regarding representation
translate into the perception of style among non-
representational works? Could art have evolved in
only one possible way? What is the significance of
style? (The first questions are broached by
Gombrich [G l]; the last by Goodman [G3])
These top ics have not been en tirely alien to
mathemati cs, even if they have not bee n
approached in terms of the overrid ing concept of
sty le. Compari sons of Greek and modern
mathematic s have often been approached with
rega rd to wha t are effec tive ly stylis tic
considerat ions, and from at least the time of
Poin care writers have contrasted individual
geomeoic "s tyles" with arithmetic or analytic ones.
However, style has not played the unifying role in
historical or philosophical studies of mathematical
thinking that it has in art. Possibly this is due to an
attitude which views mathematical progress in a
deterministic, unitary manner-a great chain of
mathematical being, so to speak.
There have been indications of change. Educators
speak of the role of "cognitive styles" and "multiple
representations" in the learning of the subjec t, and
Oue has written of a "complementary" relationship
between arithmetic and geometry which is as
suggestive of corresponding artistic styles or media
as it is of modern physics [O J. Furthermore, the
emerging field of ethnomathematics ([011& [A2])
seems to offer a particularly fresh approach to the
nature of mathematical styles developed outside
traditonal academic settings. Possibly all these
workers may have something to gain from the
methods and results of art history and psychology
with respect to style.
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One funhe r note along these lines: In [D4, p. 318],
Davis and Hersh point to the relative permanence
of mathematical results as opposed to scientific
ones. This suggests a further stylistic affinity
between mathematics and the arts. Just as Picasso
did not relegate Rembrandt to the attic, modem
geometry does not invalidate Euclid. (Note the
curren t state of Aristoteli an physics. however.)
Still, just as we can no longer look upon
Rembrandt with anything but modem eyes, we
must reinterpret Euclid in light of our current
position. The development of mathematics has
certainly been allied closely with that of science;
however. the nature of the subject's history itself
may bear more similarity with that of art. (This
point is suggested by Thomas Kuhn [K2, p. 345].)
A conception of the history of mathematics in terms
Just as Picasso did not relegate
Rembrandt to the attic, modern
geometry does not invalidate
Euclid. Still , just as we can no
longer look upon Rembrandt with
anything but modern eyes, we must
reinterpret Euclid in light or our
cur rent position.
of stylistic change might provide a better handle on
this phenomenon than one which views the
development of mathematics as analagous to that of
science.
Ethics
If the philosophy of art often seems a rather dry
and erudite affair, there is at least one set of issues
over which it becomes both heated and public-
that of censorship and the moral obligations of the
artist. Are there general topics from which the
artist. or particular works from which the public,
should be restricted access? Similarly. is the artist
obliged to deal with any particular topics or
situations? If each of the opposed paths of strict
moralism and unrestricted aestheticism appear
undesireable, what positions are left open to us?
These have been among the most discussed issues
in the philosophy of art, and can be traced from
such figures as Confucious and Heraclitus through
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•current commentators on the role of the National
Endowment for the Arts,
Issue s of a simila r nature have arisen more
frequently in mathematics in recent years. (Davis
and Hersh [D4, pp. 87-89] contrast the extreme
ethical positions of "Mathematical Maoism" and a
form of mathematical aes theticism derived-
perhaps inaccurately-from Hardy.) In general,
however, mathematics (and to a slightly less
extent, science) has been disappointingly slow in
embracing such topics. As more mathematicians
and educators enter into such discussions, it may
well be to their advantage to acquaint themselves
with the manners in which the corresponding
issues have been approached with respect to art. It
might be worthwh ile to point out here one
particular area in which the functioning of each of
mathematics, art and sc ience have gro wn
tremendously similar: All to a large degree depend
primarily for support on governmental or industrial
support ("pa tronage"). The time is ripe for a
genuine dialogue between these areas on this issue
alone.
Aesthetic Issu es
Oddly enough, purely aesthetic considerations have
made few appearances in this discussion. If we
were to adopt a strictly Platonic view of either art
or mathematics we might account for this simply
through invoking Keats: Beauty is truth, truth
beauty. Thou gh a simplification, this formula
nonetheless captures much of the attitude that
allowed realistic views of art and mathematics to
coexi st for centuries with formal conceptions of
beauty (as outli ned in Plato's Philebus). To a
modem day formalist, on the other hand, aesthetic
considerations may well be deemed irrelevant,
either relegated to the "emotive" qualities of the
positivists, or actually defined as the meeting of
certain fonnal criteria. Neither of these positions,
however, is particularly helpful in ascertaining the
role or nature of aesthe tic judgements in actually
creating art or mathematics.
This is a topic on which the mathematical literature
is vinually mute. Poincare [P4, p. 392J wrote of
aesthetics as serving the role of the "delicate sieve"
through whic h successful mathematical
"combin ati ons" passed on their way to
consciousness, but his sugge stive metaphor has
remained li ttle more than that for some nine
18
decades. (Though some interesting development is
attained in [Pt].) This is not to imply that the
artistic literature has itself resolved the problems
posed by the creative imagination, but it has
approached them directly and arrived at apparently
useful di stincti ons and insights. This same
literature may provide a fertile starting ground for
mathematical investigations. For an introduction to
these issues from philosophical and psychological
persepctives, see [SI] and [P3], respectively.
1would like to mention briefly one aesthetic value
which does seem to be pervasive in the
mathematical literature-that of elegance. As
aesthetic values go, this seems to be rather peculiar
If we were to adopt a strictly
Platonic view of either art or
mathematics we might account for
this simply through invoking Keats:
Beauty is truth. truth beauty.
to mathematical studies. (Indeed, the word actually
canies a somewhat negative connotation in, say,
painting or music.) Far from being able 10separate
the positive or negative effects this concept has had
on development, mathematical writers have not
even been particularly clear on just what elegance is
or how it stands in relation to such other concepts
as clarity, conviction, understanding or
significance . It is, however, an aesthetic value (or
at least an apparent aesthetic value) with some
degree of currency in the mathematical community ,
and as such may provide an entry point for
approaching the nature of mathematical aesthetics
in general. My own suspicion is that an overly
formal conception of elegance-say one strictly in
terms of efficiency-s-could hinder development as
much as it motivates it, whereas a pluralistic view
of various attitudes could be genuinely productive .
I would greatly appreciate hearing others' views on
mathematical elegance-particularly examples of
what they find to be elegant and some (however
imprecise) description of what leads them to say
so. (Questions: Does your conception of elegance
primarily involve results or procedures? Does
visualization have anything to do with it? Are there
arguments which you find convincing but still not
satisfying?)
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Conclus ion
Perhaps the most appropriate way to close this
article is to referagain to the epigraph with which it
opened. Superficially, mathematics may appear as
the most austere of human endeavors: rigorous,
analytic and precise. Moredeeply, it reveals itself
as one of the most mysterious. aspiring to aspects
of experience most commonly associated with
philosophy or religion (both of which, incidentally,
Hegel concluded art eventually becomes). To
understand mathematics at this deeper level- to
grasp it as a human activity which itself
human izes-c-requires a perspective that embraces
other humanist endeavors. An- in its richness, its
mysteries and its humanism-offers an abundant
wealth of experience and insight from which
mathematics may have much tolearn of itself.
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Students' Understanding of Functions in Calculus Courses
G. S. Monk
University a/ Washington
reprinted from the Humanistic Mathematics Network Newsletter #2. March. 1988.I 1. Introduction
I have long been interested in the relationship
between students' understanding of basic concepts
in mathematics and their performance on material
that is supposed to be built up out of these
concepts. But such an interest immediately raises
the question of what concepts underlie any
particular body of mathematical material and how
one might describe student understanding of these
concepts as something separate from their mastery
of the material.
To a mathematics teacher, the central concepts of a
beginningcalculus course are limit, derivative. and
integral. But these concepts do not underlie the
subjec t: they are to be developed in the course of
studying it. Most teachers would agree that, while
the course is in progress, students' understanding
of these concepts could not stand much of a test.
The concept that the subject is built our of, the one
that lies behind such notions as limit. derivative,
and integral is that of function . The question this
paper addresses is: What do students understand
of the concept of function while they are in the
process of mastering the material of a beginning
calculus course?
Boiled down to its simplest form, a funct ion is a
correspondence between two sets or between two
variables. At first, one usually describes functions
in term s of every day examples using tables,
algebraic formu las. graphs, and various artifi cial
rules. This idea is so simple that we have difficulty
imagining that our students are not already familiar
with it. And, indeed. if a function is given by a
table , or we use its graph or formu la as if it were
only a table. reading particular numerical values of
the independ ent variable as corre sponding to
particu lar numerical value s of the dependent
variable. then this IS a very simple concept---one
that most of our students acquired in high school.
I call such use or such a view of this concept a
"Pointwise understanding" of funct ions. I have
always found it interesting that when authors of
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calculus and precalculus texts give their obligatory
introductions of the concept of function, it is a
Pointwise view of the concept they are trying to get
across. But this is not actually the way the concept
of function is used in calculus.
A look at almost any page of a calculus book
shows that the cru cial question asked about
functions is: How does change in one variable lead
to change in others? How is the behavior of the
output variables influenced by variation in the input
variable? I call an ability to answer such questions
an "Across-Time understanding" of the concept of
function . The definition of the tangent line to a
graph or of its slope would be unerly meaningless
to someone who could only look at the graph or the
function at a few specific points at a time. The
essence of the definition is a tendency of the
behavior of secant lines or difference quotients as
the incremental change in the independent variable
is decreased.
This paper is based on a study of student responses
to two types of questions on final examinations in
calculus classes. one of which requires only
Pointwise understanding and the other of which
requires Across-Time understanding. The results
of this study show that these two kinds of
understanding are clearly distinguishable. But,
more crucially for teachers, they show that, at least
in simple situations, students have a confident and
secure Pointwise understanding of functions, but
even at the end of the first or second quarter of
calculus-when we tend to assume they have
already acquired this ability-they are still
struggling to see functions in an Across-Time
manner.
2. Descriptionof the Study
This study is based on four multipart problems for
beginning calculus students. Each problem has
one or two questions that test for a Pointwise
understanding of a function and one or two
q uestions th at te st for an Across-Time
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understanding of the same function. A number of
faculty members at the University of Washington
each agreed to include one of these problems as a
regular pan of an examination in a calculus class
with the results to be counted toward the exam
grade. Each of the questions was used once on a
final exam in a first-quarter calculus class (Math
124). One was also used on a late mid-quaner
exam in the first quarter calculus class and two
were used on final exams in second-quarter
calculus classes (Math 125). In all, 628 students
were involved in the study.
Inorder to facilitate analysis and discussion, these
problems are presented below in a highly
compressed form. They were expanded into a
form more readily comprehensible to students for
the exams. In most cases. they were written as
multiple choice questions.
The Problems
SLIDING SECANT
s
N
v
POINTWISE: Determine the values of A(I) and
A(3) .
ACROSS-TIME: The point p moves from 4.5 to
6.0. Does the area A(P) increase or decrease?
lWO SPEED GRAPHS
SPEED
60
MPH
30
1/4 1/2 3/4 I
HOURS
POINTWISE: Which car is going farther at time
3/4: Is CarA going faster at time 1/4 or 3/4?
ACROSS-TIME: Tell whether or not the cars are
closest together attime t=1. In the time from 1/2to
I hour, do the two cars get further apart or closer
together?
SECOND DERIVATIVE lEST
f '
p 0
POINTWISE: Find the slope of the secant and
value of v when M and N have coordinates (1.6)
and (4.12).
ACROSS-TIME: The point Q moves toward P.
Does the slopeof S increase ordecrease? Does the
value of v increase ordecrease?
9
6
3
I I I I I I
------1.. L L1_I_I_
L LI_I_I_
AREA UNDER TIJE GRAPH
y
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2 4 6 B 10 12
The graph shown is of the derivative, f' (x) .
POINTWISE: Determine the slop of the tangent
lineto f(x) at x=2. Give a value of x for which the
the tangent line to f(x) is horizontal.
ACROSS-TIME: Describe the shape of the graph
of the function f(x) for the interval I to 4.
Each student's answers to the various questions
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were then coded and recorded. so that
combinations of rightness and wrongness. or
combinations of incorrect answers could be
studied. A surrunary of the statistical sults of this
study is given in Table 1. Each grid iudicates the
results of one class's response to the two kinds of
questions on one problem. Thus, for instance in
the fir-it grid of "Sliding Secant", we see that of
the 116 students who answered the question, 53%
Sliding Secant
Across-Time
N=166 Right Wron g T
p Right 53% 34% 87%
T Wrong 4% 9% 13%
W T 57% 43%
Area Under the Graph
Across-TlIDC
N=89 Right Wrong T
p Right 63% 19% 82%
T Wrong 0% 18% 18%
W T 63% 37%
Two Speed Graphs
Across-Time
Right Wrong T
p Righ t 40% 50% 90%
T Wrong 0% 10% 10%
W T 40% 60%
Second Derivative Test
Across-TlIDC
Right Wron g T
p Right 44% 8% 52%
T Wrong 22% 28% 50%
W T 66% 36%
got both thePointwise and Across-Tune Questions
correct, and 34% got the Pointwise Question
correct while they got the across-Time Question
incorrect, We also see that, in all, 87% got the
Pointwise Question correct There are two grids
for each of the problems Sliding Secant, Area
Under the Graph, and Two Speed Graphs because
each of theseproblems was given in two different
classes.
Sliding Secant
Across-TlIDC
Right Wrong T
p Right 42% 40% 82%
T Wrong 10% 10% 20%
W T 52% 50%
Area Under the Graph
Across-TlIDC
Right Wrong T
p Right 60% 24% 84%
T Wrong 4% 11% 15%
W T 64% 35%
Two Speed Graphs
Across-TlIDC
Right Wrong T
p Right 49% 35% 84%
T Wrong 0% 16% 16%
W T 49% 51%
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Table 1 ---'<;ummary of Test Results
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3. Interpretation of the Test Results
The most striking observation to bemade about the
data shown in Table I is that the percentages of
completely correct solutions to these problems are
so low. Overall, only 50% of the solutions to
these problems were completely correct. Yet most
mathematics instructors would agree that these are
extremely simple, if not naive. problems, which
test the kinds of understanding we tend to assume
our students have as they work on the early
material in calculus. The problems are so easy that
Pointwise understanding of graphs
is prerequisite to Across-Time
understanding, but the jump from
the one to the other is a
considerable one for students.
many argue against the results by saying that the
students were tricked or that they were probably
not paying complete attention to them. But these
problems were on exams which counted toward the
students' grades in very competitive classes.
These students were strongly motivated to carefully
read and think about these questions. Moreover.
each problem had a very simply Pointwise
question, placed there, at least in part, to settle the
student into the problem and to check from his or
her answer that the quantity being asked about was
clearly distinguished. The fact that such a high
percentage did get the Pointwise questions correct
(79% on all problems) indicates that the students
were paying sufficient attention for us to make
inferences about their thought processes.
In relation to the overall percentages of correct
answers, it is probably worth noting that of the
students who were assigned final grades in these
classes. 83% received a grade of 1.6 or higher.
Since all but a handful of students who take a final
or very late mid-quarter exam receive a grade. it
seems safe to assume that these data do not include
a large pool of students who are lost in the
material, as, say, an early mid-quarter exam might.
Presumably, most of the students who took these
tests felt reasonably comfortable with their ability
to perform in the course.
To draw more refined inferences from these data
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we must separate the last problem. "The Second
Derivative Test" from the others. It presents a
different picture of students' understanding which
can only be described in relation to the picture
indicated by the other data-the pairs of results
from the first three problems.
3.1 The First Three Problems
Conunon sense would indicate that at some stage
students learn to read a graph one point at a time-
in a Pointwise manner-and once they have done
so. it is only a small jump to reading a graph at
many points. From that position. it is again only a
small step to reading a graph at infinitely many
points, or with a continuously changing variable,
i.e., reading graphs in an Across-Time manner.
Indeed a study of precalculus texts indicates that
authors and many teachers assume that this is how
things happen when students are taught functions.
However. since. in the first three problems in this
study, 85% of the students got the Pointwise
questions correct while only 53% of the students
got the Across-Time questions correct, it does
NOT seem to be the case that an Across-Time
understanding comes easily and automatically after
a Pointwise understanding has been developed.
A study of the first six grids in Table 1 illustrates
this point forcefully. It shows that reading graphs
in a Pointwise manner is a necessary. but far from
sufficient condition to reading graphs in an Across-
Time manner. In particular this data says:
a) Students who get the Pointwise questions
wrong are unlikely to get the Across-Time
questions right. (Overall, 15% who got the
Pointwise questions wrong got the Across-
Time questions right)
b) Students who get the Pointwise questions right
have variable chances of getting the Across-
Time questions right-depending on the
question, the class, etc. (Overall, 59% of the
students who got the Pointwise questions
correct also got the Across-Time questions
correct.)
c) Students who get the Across-Time questions
correct are extremely likely to get the Pointwise
questions correct. (Overall. 96% who got the
Across-Time question right got the Pointwise
question right.)
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Another way of putting thi s is that Pointwise
understanding of graphs is prerequisite to Across-
Time understanding, but the jump from the one to
the other is a considerable one for students.
That the difference between these two kinds of
questions is a qualit ative one can be seen by
analyzing the answers given to these questions by
the population of those students who got the
Pointwise questions correct For these students we
can be reasonably confident that they can read the
graph in a rudimentary fashion and that they have a
basic comprehension of the set-up of the problem.
What one sees in these answers is that, when
pressed, the students do inconsistent things; in
each wrong answer there is a self-contradiction.
Sliding secant: 43% of this population got the
Across-Ti me ques tion wrong. The mos t
common error was one in which the secant line
is regarded as mov ing, with its slope
incre asing, while the vertical di stance v is
regarded as fixed . In fact, if one views this
dia gram as made up of a system of inter-
connected " moving parts", (as the course
material requires) then all of the incorrect
answers are self-contradictory. They either
give one pan as moving and another as fixed,
or they give two parts moving, but in
inconsistent ways. It must be that these
students do not see this diagram as such a
system, that such a dynamic, Across-Time use
of a graph is quite alien to them.
Area Under the Graph: 25% of this population
got the Across-Time question wrong. These
students knew well enought how to compute
area from the two dimensions, height and base,
for the two part icular values pe l and p=3
given, but then, when they were asked about
the behavior of A(p) as p goes from 4.5 to 6.0,
they responded as if they thought that A(p) was
to be found by simply looking at the height of
the given graph. Thi s seems to be a case of a
student transforming a question into one that is
easier when the given que stion cannot be
answered.
Two Speed Graphs : 50% of this population
got one of the Across-Time questions wrong.
Most of these, (34% of this population) gave
answers to both Across-Time questions as if
the graphs shown were of position vs time-
white answering the Pointwise questions as if
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the graphs were of speed vs time. The
remaining students in this population were
conflicted. They answered one Across-Time
question as if the graphs were of speed vs time
and the other as if the graphs were of position
vs time. In both cases, we see the students
shifting their interpretation of the quantity
represented by the vertical axis when
confronted with a need to use the information
in the graphs in a novel way.
It wouJd seem to be the case that students who give
contradictory answers have lost their hoJd on the
situation described in the problem-that they are,
in some way, overloaded. To understand why
these Across-TIme questions have this effect would
require a separate study that wouJd at Jeast incJude
an analy sis of the mental processes of students
who do get the correct answers to these probJems.
My own speculation is that in order to do the
Sliding Secant and Area Under the Graph problems
correctly, the student would have to evoke in his or
It would seem to be the case that
students who give contradictory
answers have lost their hold on the
situation described in the problem-
that they are, in some way,
overloaded.
her own mind a version of the given diagram that
can be made to move and then draw conclusions
from these mental experiments. In order to do the
Two Speed Graphs problem correctly the srudent
would have to evoke a mental model of two cars,
read the information from the graphs that one car is
going farther than the other for the entire period,
and draw conclusions from this fact, while
specifically disattending from the striking pictorial
qualities of the graphs. There is very little in the
experien ce of first-quarter caJcuJus students that
would prepare them to do these things, and so it
does not surprise me that the students do so badly.
3.2 Interpretation of Results of "Second Derivative
Test"
The statistical results of " Second Derivative Test"
are very different from the results of all of the first
three problems. On this problem students did
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better on the Across-Time question than on the two
Pointwise questions (66% vs 52%). Furthermore,
in contrast to the results we saw before:
a) 22% of the students who got the Across-Time
question wrong got the Pointwise questions right.
b) 66% of the studen ts who get the Across-Time
question correct go t the Pointwise question s
correct.
c) 85% of the students who got the Pointwise
question correct also got the Across-Time question
correct.
Thus. extending the kind of analysis used to
confirm that Pointwi se understanding of graphs is
prerequisite to Across-Time understanding on the
first three problems, we arrive at the conclusion
that an Across-Time understanding of this problem
is prerequisite to a Pointwise unders tanding. But
thi s makes no se nse at all, because any
understanding of how to draw inferences from the
shape of the graph of a deriva tive, would have to
include an abil ity to make pointwise readings of
this graph.
But, in fact. it can be seen that of the 108 students
who took the test, 24 were able to use the graph of
f '(x) to select the correc t shape of f(x) over the
interval [1,4l. but at the same time, could not read
from the grap h the value of f '(2) or the value of x
for which f '(x) = O. These students are gett ing
correct an swers , but not from a ba se of
understanding. For this class, this problem is not a
good test of understanding, since the students seem
to be re spondi ng with fragments of partially
digested course material. If anyth ing, this problem
underscores the di stinction to be made between
understanding and the ability to produce correc t
answers to selected ques tions.
4. Implications of this Study
The problems used in this study were specifically
chosen for their proximity to the standard calculus
curriculum, so that the results of each problem bear
upon assumptions made by calculus instructors as
they teach particular topics in the subject
It is difficult to imagine how one could present the
notion of a tangent line and it s slope as
approximated by slopes of secant lines without
using some version of the diagram in the Sliding
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Secant problem Likewise. it is hard to conceive of
a discu ssion of the Fundamental Theorem of
Calculus that is not illustrated by something like the
diagram used in the Area Under the Graph
problem. The results of this study indicate that
these diagrams do NOT carry the meaning for our
students that we assume they do . The students can
read them in a Pointwise manner, but large
numbers of them cannot read them in an Across-
Time manner, as the subject demands they do. Of
course, it could be argued that an outcome of 50%
to 65 % of the students getting these problems
correct is not all that bad, but the rejoinder is to
point out how naive these questions are in relation
to those that arise when the slope of the tangent or
the area function are actually used in a calculus
class. For instan ce, in the Sliding Secant problem.
A student who is faced with graph
sketching or optimization problems
who has no such understanding is
forced to memorize a series of
arcane rules and procedures, which
will only move him or her further
from the possibility of
comprehension of this subject.
one could ask whether or not the slope of the
secant line increases without bound, and in the
Area Under the Graph problem. one could ask
about the behavior of the function M (for a fixed
increment of p) as the variable p increases. It seems
clear that the result s would have been so much
worse that a legitimate issue would have arisen as
to the fairness of such problems on a final exam.
One of the key issues in the first quaner of calculu s
is that the students come to understand how the
behavior of the derivative f '(x) of a function gives
us information about the behavior of the function
f(x) itself. A student who is faced with graph
sketching or optimization problems who has no
such understanding is forced to memorize a series
of arcan e rules and procedures. which will only
move him or her funher from the possibility of
comprehension of this subject. The Two Speed
Graph and Second Derivative problems indicate
that large numbers of students have little or no
basis for arriving at such an understanding,
because under the pressure of making Across-Time
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reading of f '(x) and then Across-Time inferences
about f(x), they confound these two quantities,
thinking pan of the time that they are being given
the graph of one and part of the time that they are
being given the graph of the other.
The implications of this study are not restricted to
the particular aspects of the calculus curriculum that
the problems refer to . It would not be difficult to
wri te problems related to other crucial topics in
calculus that would sho w just as cle arly that
students can use functions in a Pointwise manner,
but not in an Across-Time manner as the subject
demands. For instance , we could begin with
almost any related rate problem. show the students
the corre sponding diagram. and have them indicate
specific corresponding numerical values of the
variables. What they would not be able to do is tell
how change in on e of these vari ables causes
change in another, either in the form of how
constant increments in one lead to a pattern of
increments in the other, or qualitative ly, in terms of
related rates of change.
Across-Time understanding of functions is critical
to an understanding of calculus. This study
indi cates that most students come to a calculus
course neither equipped with it nor on the verge of
acquiring it. Specific instruction toward Across-
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Time understanding is clearly indicated, but this
rai ses genuine qdestions as to the type of
instruction that would be effective; what sorts of
activities should the students carry out to be able to
draw Across-TIme conclusions about a function11
have written, and have used for several years.
material that takes one approach to this pmblem. II
is based on a variety of graphs and diagrams at the
same level of complexity as the above problems.
As with the Two Speed Graphs problem. much of
the material requires that students translate between
a graph and a concrete context, The material is in
the fonn of instructions and questions that ask:
students to distinguish and interpret the various
kinds of information contained in the graphs and to
draw further conclusions from this information.
Watching students struggle with this material has
convinced me even more that the difficulties
students have with Across-Time understanding are
real and that one of our tasks as calculus and
precalcu lus instructors is to directly address these
difficulties and help our students overcome them.
Mailing address:
Steve Monk
Deparnnent of Mathematics GN-SO
University of Washington
Seattle. Washington 98195
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Mathematics for Math Maj ors:
Loss of Its Self-esteem
FUNG Chun-Ip
Department of Mathematics
Norrhcote College ofEducation
Hong Kong
STU Man -Keung
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Hong Kong
Paper givenat the International Conferenceof Mathematics Education-Z, Quebec. 1992
Many may think that ma thematics for math majors
presents no serious problem since math majors are
supposed to form a highly motivated and capable
group who can study mathematics almost on their
own. In reality our teaching experience tells us
otherwise. We see a wide spectrum of students
who are labelled as math majors. at least so labelled
for administrative reason because they take a
certain numberof units of courses in mathematics
including suc h and such compulsory courses in the
programme. At one end of the spectru m we are
gratified to find a few very motiv ated students with
high ca libre and st ro ng backgrou nd in
mathematics. At the other end we are depressed to
find a sma ll group of unmotivated and listless
students whose sole aim is to obtain a uni versity
degree with (less than?) minimal effort, They are
not necessari ly weak, though they usually end up
weak in mathematics. In between, we find a rather
Mathematics is too vast and too old
(yet forever new) a subject so that
when school children learn of
achievements of modern sciences in
the present century, their
mathematics lessons basically cover
what had been done up to the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuri es.
large group of stude nts, some quite motivated and
some not as motivated, some adequately prepared
and some less prepared, but all reasonably willi ng
to put in the effort. It is mainl y this middle group
that we wish to address here, but certainly what we
say applies to the first group as well. There is little
we can do about the remaining group, whose
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attitude is moulded by priori ty and value judgement
fanned within a soc iety of which they form a pan.
But if we do not do our job well, many in the
middle group may be driven to the end of the
spectrum. (In a small way we can still hope to
influence the socio-political scenario of the time !) A
student in the middle group may stan as one who
likes mathematics, at least not one who dislikes or
is apprehensive of mathematics, but in the course
of time may feel more and more confused,
al ie na ted an d fru strated. When he was in
secondary sc hool he could compute and solve
specific problems assigned. by the teacher, and
derive deli ght and satis fac tion from doing that.
Now , he is immersed in concepts which seems
neither related to what he has learnt nor suggestive
of where he is head ing . Faced w ith this
fragmentary pict ure he may resort to learning by
rote. But that usually ends up in di saster. Even if
he is lucky and passes the test which happens to
ask for knowledge reproducible from ro te learning.
he is di sillusioned. For that does not seem like
wha t an in tell ectually exciting subjec t sho uld be.
In either case he no longer feels the same affinity to
mathematics as he had felt before becoming a math
majo r! (In this article " he" , " his" are used in a
generic sense. It is tiresome to write "he or she" ,
"his or her" each time instead.) What goes wrong?
In a poster at ICME-5 of 1984. one of us wrote:
"Although mathematics is universally recognized as
a most basic, important. useful and encompassing
di scipline, it is also the least understood. the most
misunderstood and the most neglected subject by
the public. ... Mathematics is too vast and too old
(ye t forev er new) a subject so that when school
childre n learn of achievements of modern sciences
in the present century, the ir ma the matics lesson s
basic ally cover what had be en done up to the
six teenth and seventeenth centuries. Even at
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universities, most students study mathematics that
was done up to the beginning of the nineteenth
century; only a few math majors may go beyond
that, Mathematics gradually acquires a language of
its own, which can sound quite obscure to one
without that training. It must also be admitted that
mathematics demands abstract thinking so that one
must put in the requisite amount of time and effort
to really understand it. .... Thus, in schools,
mathematics teaching tend s to emphasize the
technical content with the adva ntag e that a
reasonable amount of knowledge can be
transmitted in the time allotted so that students can
learn their language and skill in a reasonably short
time. However, in so doing, the cultural aspect is
bound to be neglected. Students may be totally
unaware that mathematics has its life, that it has a
past as well as a future, that it is not just a mess of
neatly packed but lifeless formulae and theorems."
(M.K. Stu. History of Mathematics Teachers,
Mathematical Tall Timbers, Mu Alpha Theta, No.
II (March 1985), French translation in Bull. de
l'Association des Prof. de Math., no. 354 (1985),
309319.) He also wrote in the sarne article: "What
do we mean by a learned teacher? A learned
teacher should possess the following qualities: (i)
ability, (ii) knowledge , (iii) wisdom. They differ
from one another but are closely related , eac h
comp lementing the other two. An eighteenth
century Chinese scholar, Yuan Mei, once said (but
in a literary context), 'Knowledge is like the bow,
ability like the arrow; but it is wisdom which
directs the arrow to the bull's eye. ' .... A well-
balanced mathematics curriculum should address
three aims (i ) training of the mind, (ii) transmission
of technical knowledge, (iii) awareness of the
cultural aspect. If the reader is willing to bear with
a looser usage of vaguer term s, we shall
cha racterize the three aims as: (i) ability, (ii)
knowledge, (iii ) wisdom, which brings us back to
our starting point." This viewpoint was further
elaborated: "in schools we tend to empha size the
technical content of mathematics and teach it as a
skill and a tool. By so doing we attend to
'knowledge' or perhaps even some 'ability' , but
unfortunately not ' wisdom' as well. ... This may
seem effective, at least it seems so from
examination performance. In Hong Kong , the
passing percentage and average sco re in
mathematics in the Secondary School Leaving
Certificate Examination are usually higher than that
in other subjec ts. The recent report of the 2nd
Inte rna ti ona l Evaluat io n of Ed ucationa l
Achieve ment reveals that Hong Kong students
HMN Journal #9
score pretty high marks in mathematics among
some twenty coun tries/districts. But does this
reall y signify succes s in our mathematics
education? Are we complacent about this? I am
doubtfu l of that. I even feel confused , because
among the students I have taught only a few show
interest in mathematics or perform well , the
remaining majority, if not downright abhorren t of
mathematics , are indifferent to mathematics. Is it
because, in dem anding technical ability, we
sacrifice other aspects and pay a price for those
qualities which cannot be assessed by short-term
standard tests? ..... From a broad viewpoint of
education, this is a big failure. A.N. Whitehead
once said in The Aims 0/ Education (1929) :
'Culture is activity of thought, and receptiveness to
beauty and human feeling. Scraps of information
have nothing to do with it. A merely well-
infonned man is the most useless bore on God's
earth. What we should aim at producing is men
who possess both culture and expert knowledge in
some special direction:' (M.K. Stu, Who needs
history of mat hematics (in Chinese ), Shuxue
Tongbao (Mathematics Bulletin), 4 (1987), 42-44.)
In short, students lack a global view of the subject
of mathematics and rare ly appreciate or enjoy it
from a cultural aspect, and too little emphasis is put
'Culture is activity of thought, and
receptiveness to beauty and human
feeling, Scraps of information have
nothing to do with it. A merely
well-informed man is the most
useless bore on God's earth, What
we should aim at producing is men
who possess both culture and expert
knowledge in some special
direction. '
on the subject's own worth. This is rather at
variance with the view expressed by great
mathematicians since antiquity. Let us just quote
that of a great mathematician in our century,
Hermann w eyl, who said: "We do not claim for
mathematics the prerogative of a Queen of Science,
there are other fields which are of the same or even
higher importance in education. But mathematics
sets the standard of objec tive tru th for all
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intellectual endeavors; science and technology bear
witness to its practical usefuln ess. Besides
language and music. it is one of the primary
manifestations of the free creative power of the
human mind. and it is the universal organ for
world-underst anding through th eore ti cal
construction. Mathematics must therefore remain
an essential element of the knowledge and abilities
which we have to teach, of the culture we have to
transmit. to the nex t gene ra tion" The
unsatisfactory situation of mathematics teaching in
schools seems to persist at the university level.
which is further aggravated by the fact that the
subject materi al becomes more ab stract and
diversified at that level. Students tend to have a
feeling that they are on a "sight-seeing" tour of
museum exhibits, only they are not panicularly
interested as museum-goers! Throughout the
undergraduate years for the majority of students, if
they do form a good opinion of mathematics, it
would be that mathematics is a useful tool. But
then. for those who do not need to use that tool that
much, what worth is there left of the subjec t? We
share the ed ucat ion philosophy that views "the
critical and the evaluative function of education as
its central contribu tion to the intellectual and
spiri tual development of the student" (Abe
Shen itzer, "Some thought s on the teaching of
mathematics," Math. Intelligencer, 8 (1986), 21-
24). Abe Shenitzer goes on to say: "Uninterpreted
or underinterpreted technical material .... destroys
mind and soul. and teaches cynicism and contempt
for teacher and subject alike." (A recent an icle of
Abe Shenitzer, titled "An unorthodox "test" which
appears in vol. 99 (January, 1992) of Amer. Math.
Monthly will give us much food for thought.)
Some may think that as long as students acquire the
technical con tent. it is rather secondary whether
students see the cultu ral value of mathematics or
not. We disagree. Looki ng at the history of our
subject we be lieve that the developmen t of
mathematics education and even of mathematics
itself is. to a large extent. dic tated by the genera l
preval ent "Mathematics Anschauung " of the
comm unity at the time and the place. (As an
illustration, see a poster display at this Congress:
M.K. Siu, Mat hema tics Educat ion in Ancient
China: What Lesson Do We Learn From It?)
Emphasizing only the usefulness of mathematics at
the expense of its cultural aspect leads to a loss of
self-esteem for the subject (and for those mat h
majors who study the subject). As a result, the
supply of good teachers and good researchers is
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dwindling. Furthermore thi s problem has a
snowballing effect, for quite a number of math
majors are to become teachers later. in schools and
universities. If they lack a general outlook of the
subject and fail to realize how the subject is woven
into the full tapestry of a general education. then
they will produce crops of students who will be
exposed to such an outlook and in tum some of
these students will become teachers. and so on.
Our teaching aim in mathematics is to let students
acquire good study habits and the ability to stand
on their own . to teach them to think both logically
and heuristically. to give them the room to think, to
let them appreciate the beauty and impon of
mathematics. and more generally to instil in them a
In short, students lack a global view
of the subject of mathematics and
rarely appreciate or enjoy it from a
cultural aspect, and too little
emphasis is put on the subject's own
worth.
regard for learning. This seems far more important
than to make sure they know a hundred theorems.
(But if our aim is achieved. they will know those
hundred theorems as a by-produ ctl) Actually, the
same objective has been stressed in other reports,
for instance Standard 6 of developing perspectives
in "A Call For Change: Recommendations For the
Ma thematical Pr ep aration of Teachers of
Mathematics MAA Report" . Mathemat ical
Association of America (editor, I .R.C. Leitzel),
1991 and the five goals in "Curriculum and
Evaluation Standards for School Mathematics".
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics.
1988. What we wish to add is that these goals are
equally important , if not more, for those math
majors who go on to become re search
mathematicians.
What can be done? We beli eve attention to a
general attitude is more imponant than the subject-
content itself. which is generally agreed upon
except for deta ils. We believe the curriculum for
math majors, for both prospective re search
mathematicians or mathematics teacher (these two
should not be exclusive of eac h other) should be
the same; for as Klein put it in his 1872 Inaugural
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Lecture at Erlanger on mathematics education (not
to be confused with his more famous "Erlanger
Program" which was on geometry and which was
writte n before his appointment; see D.E. Rowe,
Felix Klein' s Erlanger Antrittsrede, Hist. Math.,
12 (1984),123-141): "We want the future teacher
to stand above his subject, that he have a
conception of the present state of knowledge in his
field, and that he generally hecapable of following
its further development. ... Although hardly one in
ten will later for himself take up scientific research,
anyone who completes such a study even once
takes wi th him an altoget her different type of
certainty in jud gement and liveliness of
conception ." We call this a "mathematical taste",
whi ch corresponds to the item " wisdom"
mentioned before. In this respect. the " interface"
between schoo l ma thematics and universi ty
mathematics should be paid attentio n to in all
undergraduate courses whenever possible. in the
spirit of Klein ' s "elementary mathematics from an
ad vanced standp oint". Although skills in
mathematics are to be acquired, understanding and
a global view should be of primary importance. In
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certa in instances such awareness cannot be tested
easily, but likewise many time-honoured aims in
education cannot be tested either; they show up in
the growth of perso nality. We should encourage
the doing, the reading, the writing and the talking
of mathematics among students. We should pay
attention to main taining a "continuity" in the
courses, i.e. what was learnt in a previous course
may pop up in subsequent courses, as part of the
content, as examples, or even just as remarks in
passin g. We should incorporate a " sense of
history" into all courses to let students appreciate
the long process of evolution and of the formation
of key ideas and concepts. (We need not stress
further the usefulness of mathematics. not because
it is not but because enough has been said about
that. Ironically, its usefulness, in a sense.
attributes to its neglect as an intellectual discipline!)
To regain the self-esteem of mathematics (and
mathematics majors) we must convince the
audience that mathem atics is an intellectually
rewarding subject which plays a central role in
human culture.
3/
Philosophy of Mathematics, Mathematics Education
and Philosophy of Mathematics Education
Zheng Yuxin (Y. Zheng)
Department of Philosophy
Nanling University. China (P. R. C.)
As a philosopher of mathematics. I have been
thinking about, or rather, worried about the
follow ing qu esti on: is there any important
rel ation ship between the philosophy of
mathematics and actual mathematical activities
(including mathematical research, teaching and
learning)? Or, does the philosophy of mathematics
have any important infl uence on act ua l
mathematical activities? I think the answeris 'yes';
and I have also tried to do some things in this
direction by working in the field of methodology of
While the advancement of hum an
society, is the most importan t
externa l impetu s, it is the
theoretical studies of mathematics
education during the past decade
which have laid the necessary
foundation for the new reform
movement.
mathematics (cf. Y. Zheng, 1985, 1991a, 1991b).
But it is only a personal opinion and has limited
influence, so when I came to the USA as a visiting
scholar in 1991, this problem was still deeply
rooted in my mind. However, what I have learnt
in the field of mathematics education in the USA is
really a great pleasure for me, as it does show
clearly that there is a close relationship between the
philosophy of mathematics, mathematics education
and mathematics as well: it is modem research in
the philosophy of mathematics which offers the
necessary ideological foundation for the new
reform movement of mathematics education in the
USA, and then, in this way, the philosophy of
mathematics can exert a great influence on the
future of mathematics,
The first and second parts of this paper will use the
modem development of mathematics education in
the USA as a background to make an analysis of
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the great infl uence of the philosophy of
mathemati cs on mathematics education. The third
section discusses the problem of how to develop
the subject 'philosophy of mathematics education ,
which in fact can be regarded as an impetus from
mathematic s education to the further development
of philosophy of mathematics and philosophy in
general.
1. New Developments of Mathematics
Education
Mathematics education in the USA is now
undergoing a new reform movement, to which
Eyerybody CouOls, published by the National
Research Council in 1990, gives the following
description:
"Over the next cwo decades, the nation's schools,
colleges, and universities will undergo major
transitions in mathematics programs-s-transitions
that will involvefundamental changes in curricular
content, in modes of instru ction, in teacher
education, in profe ssional dev elopment , in
methods of assessment, and in public attitudes,"
(p.87)
While the advancement of human society, i.e. the
transition from the industrial age to the infonnation
age, is the most important external impetus, it is the
theoretical studies of mathematics education during
the past decade which have laid the necessary
foundation for the new reform movement. In this
sec tion, we ma ke a brief survey of the ncw
theoretical studies. They are chiefly: the emphasis
on probl em so lving , the psychology of
mathema tical learning, and the social-cultural
approach to mathematics education.
(1). The emphasis on problem solving
' Problem Solving' was the main slogan for
mathem atics educat ion during the eighties.
"Problem solving must be the focus of school
mathematics" (NCTM, 1980, p. 2); and by
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F'problem solving' . it means ' to use a variety of
mathematical knowledge and methods effectively to
solve nonroutine problems. including both actual
problems and those originated from mathematics
itself.
Putting forward the idea of focusing on problem
solving is a giant step for mathematics education.
because the idea represents a great shift in the
conception of mathematics education, i.e., the idea
itself is a direct negation of the traditional
conception of mathematics education, especially,
the teaching method based on 'transmission of
information' and the trend of 'separating learning
from application'. To explicate, the key points of
'focusing on problem solving' are as follows:
First. students should learn mathematics by the
activities of solving problems. That is, "'knowing'
mathematics is 'doing' mathematics ....instruction
should persistently emphasize 'doing' rather than
'knowing that' ... (NCfM, 1989, p. 7) Second. by
solving problems, especially those having actual
meaning. students can learn to value mathematics,
and become more confident in their own
mathematical abili ty. Third, the final aim of
mathematics education should be to improve
students' ability of problem solving, especially
help them leam to think mathematically.
Generally speaking, the idea that problem solving
must be the focus of school mathematics is now
widely accepted; and as this idea is directl y
opposit e to the traditi onal conception of
mathematics education, it is said that ' solving
nonroutine problems is the central theme of the
current reform movement in school mathematics.'
(T. Romberg, 1991, p. 9)
(2). The emphasis on th e psychology of
mathematical learning
The study of the psychology of mathematical
learning is itself a result of the further development
of psychology: it has been beyond the level of
general study and penetrated into special fields.
Furthermore , where modern studies of the
psychology of mathematics learning are concerned,
we should pay more attention to the cognitive
science approach to mathematics education and"the
constructivist view of mathematics learning".
To explicate. the basic position of cognitive
psychology is that the study of psychology should
not (as behaviorists suggest) be limited to 'vi sible
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behavior ' but penetrate into the inner infonnation
processing of the mind, including the storage.
retriev al , representation , development of
knowledge and so on. Also.the so-called
'constructivist view' can be regarded as a main
conclusion of cognitive psychology: as far as
mathematics learning is concerned. it asserts that
the learning of mathematics is not a passive
reception but a process of construction based on
previous experience and knowledge.
If the idea " focusing on problem-solving" is a
direct negation of the traditional concept of
mathematics education, then the cognitive studies
of mathematics learning, especially the
constructivist view of mathematics learning. have
offered further arguments for this fundamental
transition from the microscopic view. And just for
we should take as a background the
whole culture of human society in
the study of mathematics education.
This is to say, mathematics
education should represent clearly
the features of the time.
this reason, the constructivist view on mathematics
leaming has recently attracted great attentions in the
field of mathematics education. For example. as
R. Davis, C. Maher and N. Noddings say in
Constructivist Views on the Teachin& and Leamine
of Mathematics:
'The idea of "constructivismt-s-hardly mentioned a
few years ago-nowadays attracts a lot ofattention
in the world of mathematics education. A great
many people now think and write about it. andthe
people who do so do not agree with one another
..Still, beneath the theoretical argumentation. there
is a substantial agreement about the nature 0/
learners , the nature 0/ mathematics. and the
appropriate form of pedagogy." (R. Davis, C.
Maher and N. Noddings / 99/, p. / 87)
(3). The soclat-cultural approach to
mathematics education
The first implication of the social-cultural study of
mathematics is that we should take as a background
the whole culture of human society in the study of
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mathemat ics education . This is to say.
mathematics education should represent clearly the
features of the time. In fact, it is exactly the most
important feature of the new reform movement of
mathematics edu cation in the USA: it is the
transition from the industrial soc iety to the
informati on society which offers the most
important impetus to the movement, and the final
aim of the movement is to create the kind of
mathematics education that not only meets the need
of the time but also uses fully the new technology;
in a word. we should crea te the mathematics
education of the information age.
Secondly. the social-cult ural approach to
mathematics education has also made clear the
social nature of mathematics learning and teaching.
Although the constructi on of mat hemati cs
knowl edge should be carried out rel ati vely
independently by all individuals, such activities are
canied on in some 'social environment' , and must
include th e proce sse s of ex pre ss ing ,
communicating, comparing, criticizing, improving
and so on, so that it is in fac t a ' social
construction ' . Besides, the social nature of
mathematics teaching can be seen clearly by the fact
First, every mathematics teacher is
(consciously or unconsciously)
doing his work under the influence
of some conception of mathematics
and mathematics education, and the
latter are in fact manifestations of
the social nature of mathematics
education.
that the role played by teachers is ju st the
' Intermediate ' between the whole system of
education and the objects of education. In other
words, teachers' duty is to carry out the overall aim
of mathematics education in facing the concrete
students and the concrete situation of teaching in
general.
Finally, one more important implication of the
social-cultural approach to mathematics education
is the imp ortance of conception both to
mathematics teaching and learning: First, every
math emati cs teacher i s (consc ious ly or
unconsciously) doing his work under the influence
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of some conception of mathematics and
mathematics education, and the latter are in fact
manifestations of the social nature of mathematics
education. Secondly, as far as students are
concerned. the importance of conception lies in the
fact that mathematics learning is a process in which
not only mathematical knowledge is constructed
but also some conception, belief and attitude of
mathematics are formed, and the latter in tum will
exert great influence on the learners' further study
of mathematics and even for their whole life (as a
pan of their whole ideology). For example, it is
just by such consideration that Curriculum and
Evaluation Standards for School Mathemat ics ,
which is one of the most important documents
shaping the new reform movement, lists ' learning
to value mathematics' and 'becoming confident of
one's own ability' as the first two goals for
mathematics education.(pp. 5-6)
Obviously, if the psychology of mathematics
learning is the study on the microscopic level, then
the social-cultural study belongs to the macroscopic
level; and just as J. Kilpatrick points out in his A
History of Research in Mathematics Education ,
'Researchers were taking the social and cultural
dimensions of mathematics educatio n more
seriously.' (1992, p. 30)
2. From the philosophy of mathematics to
mathematics education
Research in the above three directions as a whole
repre sents a new conception of mathematics
education, whose kernel is new ideas about the
questions 'what is mathematics' and 'what it means
to know mathematics' . At just these points, we
can see clearly the important influence exerted by
philosophy of mathematics on mathematics
education.
To explicate. philosophy of mathematics had for a
long time been under the tradition of 'foundational
studies '. The common position for all the main
schools in the study of mathematics foundations,
i.e, logicism, intuitioni sm and formalism, took
mathematics as a body of mathematical knowledge,
and it was hoped that, by the logical analysis of the
inner structures of mathematical knowledge. they
could lay a finn foundation for mathematics so that
the problem of the soundness of mathematics could
be solved forever.
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The researchers of the above three schools had
produced many important results. As far as their
fin al aims were conce rned, however, they all
failed , and as time passed , a big defici ency of the
found ation al studies has become clear, i.e, it
deviates tenibly from actual mathematical activities.
So, after the period of the 'the golden age' (about
1890-1940), the st udy of the philosophy of
mathematics stagnated.
In the sixties, mainly under the influence of the
philosophy of science , some new phenomena
appeared in the field of philosophy of mathematics,
which in turn represented a transition of the basic
positions. The new position was that mathematics
should be mainly regarded as creative activiti es of
human beings rather than a specific body of fixed
mathematical knowl edge. Thus, in comparison
with the traditional view of mathemati cs, the new
conception-which may be called ' the human view
of mathematics'-contains the following changes:
First, the new view emphasizes the development of
mathematics: as creative activities of human beings,
mathematics is not some thing static and fossilized
but has been changing all the time and will keep on
changing in the fu ture. Particularly, as daily
math ematical activities are concerned, they are
necessarily complicated proce sses includin g
conjectures, errors and tests.
Second, the development of mathematics is not
only a process of accumulation but also includes
qualit ative ch anges. Th at is, there are also
revolutions in mathematics.
Thi rd , the human view of ma thematics also
confirms that mathematics consists of meaningful
activities, so that it should not be identified as the
mechanical manipulation of meaningless symbols.
As the human view of mathematics represents a big
transition of basic idea s, it has also opened new
directions for the study of the philosophy of
mathematics.
For example, there is firs tly the social-cultural
approach to mathematics. To be con crete,
mathema ticians in modern society are all working
in some social envi ronment, and therefore are, in
fact, members of 'mathemat ical communities'. In
fact, the working aim for most mathematicians is to
get mathematical sta te men ts which are
repre sentable by the language uniformly accepted
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by the community, and are resolutions to those
problems unifonnly regarded as important or
significant by the community, and are based on
arguments or methods uniformly accepted by the
community. (cf. P. Kitcher, 1984) In fact , such a
prescriptive role of the mathematical community
based on individual mathematicians is just the
concrete manifestation of what might be called
'mathematical culture' (in the level of graduate
school and mathematics research).
Furthermore, as mathematical researches are social
activities, we can therefore study the impetus and
laws for the development of mathematics from a
higher level. This is to say, we can transcend an
individual's work and take the whole human
society as a background for the study of the
historical development of mathematics. (cf. R.
Wilder, 1981 ) Obviously. such studies denote that
philosophy of mathematics has extended from daily
mathematical activities to macroscopic studies.
Also, from the microscopic view, mathematical
activities are all mental processes. In particular, the
creation of all mathematical concepts is a process of
construction. To be concrete, mathematical entities
are not objects existing in the empirical world but
creati ons of abstraction. Furthermore, in strict
research , no matter whether the entities concerned
have or do not have empirical backgrounds, we
cannot rely on intuition but on deduction from the
corresponding definitions. Therefore, the process
of mathematical abstraction is, in fact, an activity of
as creative activities of human
beings, mathematics is not
something static and fossilized but
has been changing all the time and
will keep on changing in the future.
construction. That is, mathematical entities are
constructed by the corresponding definitions
(including explicit and implicit definitions), and
only by those processes of "logical construction"
can the corresponding mathematical entities be
transferred from ' the inner creations of the mind' to
'the ou ter independent existence'. (cf Y. Zheng,
1991 b.) Furthermore, because mathematical
entities are not objects in the empirical world, the
study of mathematical entities must include a
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,process of 're-creation' (in comparison with ' the
primary creation' ). That is, people must actually
construct the corresponding mathematical entities in
the mind, so that what had been 'objectified ' with
the aid of language can be transferred back into
'inner elements of the mind'.
Putting together the above discussion of the
modem developments of mathematics education
and of the philosophy of mathematics, we can see
clearly that it is modem research in the philosophy
of mathematics which has offered the important
ideological foundation for the new reform
movement of mathematics education in the USA.
For example, the emphasis on problem solving is
obviously a necessary consequenc e of the human
view of mathematics. In fact, an important starting
the distinct feat ure of the 'new
math' was that littl e attention was
paid to the actual cognitive
processes, of how hum an beings
think about mathematics.
point of the new reform movement of mathematics
education is ju st the recognition that school
mathematics under the old tradition is not 'real
mathematics', and the idea of 'foc using on problem
solving' in turn is to put students in the same
situation as mathematicians. T. Romberg says on
this point:
'For over two thousand years, mathematics has
been viewed as a body of infallible truth far
removed f rom the affairs and values of humanity.
These views are being challenged by a growing
number of philosophers of mathematics....Such a
dynamic view of ma themat ics has powerfu l
educational consequences. The aims of teaching
mathematics need to include the empowerment 0/
learners to create their own mathematical
knowledge; ....When mathematics is seen in this
way, it needs to be studied in living contexts that
are meaningfu l and relevant to the learners,
including their languages, cultures, and everyday
lives, as well as their schoolbased experiences ,'
(T. Romberg, 1992, p . 751)
Secondly, altho ugh 'constructiv ist ' is a new
terminology in the world of mathematics education,
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it is quite familiar to philosophers of mathematics.
Therefore, the 'rise' of the constructivist view on
mathematical leaming and teaching can be regarded
as an extension or transition from philosophy of
mathematics to mathematics education. What
should also be noted is that, mathematics educators
have found important illuminations for instruction
from modern studies of the philosophy of
mathematics and philosophy of science in general.
For example, based on the discussion about
scie ntific revolutions, especially about the
transition of 'paradigm' in philosophy of science,
some mathematics educators suggest that forming
'conceptual conflict' is a requisite and efficient way
for promoting students' mathematical thoughts,
especially for the correction of their wrong ideas.
Finally, the social cultural approach to mathematics
education obviously corre sponds directly to the
social cul tural studies of mathematics . For
example, in correspondence with the concept of
'mathematical community', mathematics educators
have introduced the concept of ' mathematics
edu cati on com munity', whic h consis ts of
mathematics teachers, mathematics education
researchers, directors for mathematics teacher' s
training, supervisors for mathematics curriculum,
makers of policies for mathematics education,
designers of mathematics examinations and so on,
and the main feature of a mathematics education
community is also that all its members share
(consciously or unconsciously) somewhat the same
conception of mathematics education.
In addition to the above discussion, what should be
noted is that we can analyze the relationship
between the philosophy of mathematics and
mathematics education in a more general sense.
For example, the tradition al conception of
mathematics education reflects to a great extent the
'absolute view of mathematics' (we should also see
the influence of mechanism here). Besides, it is
the foundational study mentioned above that offers
the necessary ideological foundation for the 'new
math movement' , which was seen throughout all
the western countries during the sixties . In fact,
the distinct feature of the 'new math' was the
emphasis on the logical structures of mathematical
knowledge and little attention was paid to the actual
cognitive processes, of how human beings think
about mathematics. We can See here very clearly
the influence of the ' foundadonists' . The French
mathematician R. Thorn, while commenting on
'new math' . clearly raised the following question:
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"'Modern" Mathemat ics: an Educat ional and
Phi losophical Error?' And as an answer, he says ,
for example,
'Set theory....is the essential litany intoned by
those who advocate the so -called modern
math ematics. Some affirm that the use of set
theory permits the entire renovati on of mathematics
teach ing and that, thanks to th is change, the
average student will be ab le to achieve mastery of
the curriculum. Needless to say, this is pure
illu sion .. .Everything con sidered , the excessive
optimism bred by the use of set theory symbol has
its roots in a philosophical error.' (Thorn, 1971, p.
75)
To summarize, we should definitely confirm that
there is an important rel ationship betwee n the
philosoph y of mathematics and ma them atics
education; and then, via mathematics education,
philosophy of mathemati cs will exert great
influence on the future of mathematics.
3. Towards a philosophy o f m athematics
education
The above discussion shows clearly the important
rel a tion ship be tween the p hilo sophy of
mathematics and mathematics education; however,
at the same tim e we should not identify the
phil osophy of mathematics with the theoretical
foundation of mat hem atics educat ion. In other
words, mathematics ed ucation should have its own
relatively independent theoretical foundation.
In fact , every subject has its ow n history during
which it has formed its special field , problems and
theories. With thi s view, we ca n see clearly the
differences between the philosophy of mathematics
and the theoretical fou nda tion of math ematics
education:
On the one hand , the philosophy of mathematics,
as philosophical ana lysis of mathem atics, has its
special problems. In fact , in comparison with
those problems mentioned above, the onto logy and
epistemology of mathematics are of a more basic
nat ure. Th e ontology of mathematics ca n be
described as: do mathematical en tities have an
independent existence? If the answer is ' yes' , then
what kind of existence is it; if the answer is ' no',
what is the meaning of mathematics? On the other
hand, the ep istemology of mathemat ics is focusing
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on whether mathematical statements are a priori or
empirical. The fac t that the ontology and
epistemology o f math emati cs have occupied
important po sitions in the philosophy of
mathematics is a natural result of the speciality of
mathematics, especially i ts abs tractness (the
specia lity of mathema tics lies not only in the
contents of mathematical abstraction, but also in its
degree and method. cf. Y. Zheng, 1991). And just
for this reason, although there have been some new
direc tions in the fiel d of the philosophy of
mathemati cs since the six ties, any sy stematic
theory in the philosophy of mathematics still has to
give definite answers (or detailed analysis) to the
ontology and epi stemology of mathematics. In
fact, ju st as P. Benacerraf points out in his paper
Mathem atical Touh, the difficulty in the study of
philosophy of mathematics just lies in 'the dilenuna
of the onto logy and epis temology of mathematics',
This is to say, those theories which are satisfactory
in the ontology always have serious deficits in the
epi stemo logy ; while the others which are
satisfactory in epistemology always have defici ts in
the ontolog y. However, all the se discussions do
not seem to have important implications for
mathematics education.( P. Benacerraf 1983)
On the other hand, the theoretical foundation of
mathem atic s education obviously should incl ude
the following contents:
(1 ) The View of Mathematics. This is the
answer to the question ' what is mathematics'. It
sho uld incl ude no t on ly ana lys is about the
re lation ship be tween objective mathematical
knowled ge and the creative activities of the human,
but also an explication of the subject (and nature)
of mathematics, For example, according to the
modern view, mathematics should be defined as
't he science of patterns' (cf L. Steen, 1988 and Y.
Zheng, 1991 ), and this definition seems to be a
confirma tion of the duality of mathematics, i.e., it
is both descriptiv e and prescriptive.
(2) Th e Analysi s of the Nature or
Mathematical Learning. Differing from the
study of epistemology in the ph ilosophy of
mathemat ics, the final ai m of the analysis of
mathemat ical learni ng is not to get a definite
conclusion abou t the a priori and empirical nature
of mathematical statements but rather to study the
ac tual information process of the mind and
explic at e it s implicat ions for mathematics
edu cation . Therefore, the key question here is
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whether mathematics learning is a process of
' transmission of information' centering on teachers
or an activity of di scovery (re-creation) by
students. Besides, from the social-cultural view,
there is also the question whether mathem atics
education is an isolated activity or an organic pan
of the whole cultural system of the human.
(3) The Aim of Mathematics Education. As
a conscious act ivit y of hum ans, mathematics
education has its definite aim which should reflect
the features of the time, i.e., it should meet the
needs of the time and reflect the advance of science
and technology. Particularly, we should analyze
carefully the great influ ence on math ematics
educ ation exerted by the transition from the
industrial age to the information age and the rapid
devel opment of compu ter technology. For
example, as the information age is in some sense
'the age of mathematizing' , the development of the
society has made a higher standard for every
student an historical necessity for mathematics
education (cf. NRC. 1990. 1991). In addition, the
rapid development of computer technology has not
only offered efficient tools but also opened a new
prospect for mathematics education. For example,
with the help of computers, people can really be
freed from the influence of the traditional
conception of mathem atics education that
emphasizes ver y routine skills , and then
concentrate on the promotion of the students'
ability in problem-solving.
By the above discussion, we can now see clearly
that there are both some important relationship and
differences between the philosophy of mathematics
and the theoretical foundati on of mathematics
education. What is more , it is obvious that we
should also differentiate naive conceptions of
mathematics education from systematic theories.
Therefore, there is a deep need to introduce the
concept 'philosophy of mathematics education' .
To be explicit, philosophy of mathematics
educat ion co nsists mainly of the following
contents: the view of mathematics, the analysis of
the nature of mathematics learning (and teaching),
and the aim of mathematics education; and as a
whole it forms the theoretical foundation for
mathematics education.
To make things clearer, we are going to make a
brief introduction and co mment on the most
popular view of mathematics education in China.
According to this view, the theory of mathematics
education mainly consists of the followin g three
pans: the theory of mathematics curriculum, the
theory of mathematic s teaching, and the theory of
mathematics learning. 'The theoretical foundations
of the theory of mathematics education include the
foll owing subjects: d ialectica l materiali sm
(phil osoph y) , ma them atic s , educ ation ,
psychology, logic, and com puter science: (Cao
Cal-han. 1989. p. 9 ) So. the basic framework of
this theory of mathematics education is as follows:
philosophy
I
1he his tory 0 f meUlOOOlDtY 0 computer
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I
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However. we now know clearly that the analysis
of the theoretical fo undations of mathematics
education should no t be limited to listi ng all the
relevan t subjects; instead, we should se t up its own
theoretica l foundation. i. e.• the philosophy of
mathematics education . Therefore, we are, in fac t,
introd ucing the fo llowin g new th eoretica l
framework for ma the ma tics educa tion ( in wh ich
we have al so made so me imp ro vement and
extension of th e conte nts of th e theory of
mathematics education; however, it goes beyond
the topic of thi s paper), as shown above.
Fina lly , wha t should be emp hasized is that ,
al though there is already some preliminary work in
this direction (c.f., P. Ernest, 1990), philosophy
of mathematics education is still a new field waiting
for fu rth er s tud ies. We can see by the above
discussion that the fou nd ing of a systematic theory
of philosop hy of mathe matics edu cation need s
cooperation between philosophers and educators .
Actually, the most importan t thing is to introspect
one's own co ncept of mathemati cs education, so as
to tran sfer fro m the old, back ward co nce ption to
the advanced a nd sc ien ti fic conceptio n of
mathem atic s edu ca tio n. In fact, just as Everybody
Counts, which is another important document for
the new reform of mathematics education in the
USA, po ints out, the followi ng transition s ' will
dom inate the process of c hange during the
remainder of this century' :
Transition 1: The focus of school mathematics is
shifting f rom a dua lism mission-minimal
mathematics f or Ihe majority, advanced
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mathematics f or a few-i-to a singular focus on a
signifi cant common core of mathematics for all
students,
Transition 2: The teaching of mathematics is
shifting f rom an authoritarian model based on
"transmission 0/ knowledge" 10 a student centered
practice featuring "stimulation oflearning."
Transition 4: The teaching of Mathematics is
shifting f rom preoccupation with inculcating
routine skills 10 developing broad based
mathematical power. (p . 81-82)
These transitions, of course. can not be carried out
spontaneous ly in practice; just the opposite,
' naive ness ' in philosophy (one frequent fonn of
'naiveness ' is the ignoring of philosophy) always
leads people to become slaves of some 'modem'.
but a t the sa me time 'bad' philosophy. For
example, what is called 'the radical constructivist
view ', which seems to be a 'modern fashion' in the
world of mathema tics education in the USA, is, in
fact, a revision of intuitionism in the philosophy of
mathem atics. And as intu itionism necessarily leads
to mathematical mysticism' and 'mathematical
solipsism ' by its den ial of the representability and
objecti vity of mathematics, this philosophical view
has already been widely criticized. Obviously, it
shows more clearly the importance of the study of
philosop hy of mathematics education; and it in turn
can also be regarded as an impetus for mathematics
educat io n to th e further development of the
philosophy of mat hemati c s and philosophy in
general.
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Poems by Lee Goldstein
Plighted Symbolism
Through the credential nonverbality
Are theorems of that that is of the not benamed abstraction,
And where the verbality, thence the symbolism seems may be to willing,
While the masters of the symbolism
Know that unwillingness and yet can act them;
For the locus of what is not benamed
Bodes mathematical,
And such constructivism is believed
In this very alterity.
1993
The Imagination
The infiniteth inbeing of desire expressed objectively ,
For instance, 'the set of all sets which do not include themselves',
Implies an ineluctable phenomenon
That precludes mental escape,
Unless there is admitted the glamourous search
Of the not at the object,
Bur of a living, instead, past the paradoxes implicit in desired (or undesired) objects
Where truthful objectedness arises, identically,
Only upon a nonce imagination of the "things ideal."
1993
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Space Venture
Edward E. Chipman
830 N. Shore Dr. NE
Palm Shrs., 319
St. Petersburg, FL 33701
Into the vast mystery of the universe
Man does probe with man-made star,
Thrusting into heavenly course
Toward some goal unknown , afar.
Mighty is the venturing deed,
And the whole world stands in awe;
Yet he moves by spirit' s need.
Still he follows heaven ' s law.
Need of solving in his soul,
Moving outward toward the dark;
Striving toward a beckoning goal
Gendered by the spirit's spark.
Restless from the earth he moves,
Searching out the heavenly seas.
Among far planets now he roves;
More than flesh he seeks to please.
This his nature, given of God:
To search out the unknown star,
Discontent to lag and plod
Where the sated pleasures are.
His a nature heaven-endowed.
Made for searching and far sight;
Knowing to himself is owed,
And to God, the spiri t's flight.
Into the vast mystery of the universe
Man does probe with man-made star,
Thrusting into heavenly course
Toward some goal unknown, afar.
Fray he, as he serves heaven's law
In implicit destiny,
Never shall he lose the awe,
Wonder of the majesty
That endows him with the power
To thrust forth to farther space.
Pray on eanh he may explore
With the same intensity
Brotherhood, and frie ndship's dower,
Love's unplumbed immensity:
And as he moves from more 10 more,
Gain God's peace, and inner grace
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